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Introduction 
In 2004, Northwest Airlines came under fire for breaking European 
information privacy laws.1 The Dutch government agency responsible for 
privacy opened an investigation against Northwest. What was the 
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 1. See Letter from Ulco van de Pol, Vice-President, College Bescherming Persoons-
gegevens (Dutch data protection authority), to Northwest Airlines (Apr. 6, 2004), at 
http://www.cbpweb.nl/downloads_uit/z2004- 0310.pdf?refer=true&theme=purple. 
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charge? The airline company had turned over passenger data to NASA in 
breach of European privacy rights, to assist NASA with developing an 
anti-terrorism database. The Dutch agency closed the investigation with-
out taking administrative action or turning the matter over to criminal 
prosecutors because Northwest had since changed its information pri-
vacy policy. But the Dutch agency expressed “serious doubts” as to 
whether Northwest had complied with European law.2  
European and American citizens are caught between two very differ-
ent, often clashing, legal cultures of privacy. In the European Union, 
privacy is essential to protecting citizens from oppression by the gov-
ernment and market actors and preserving their dignity in the face of 
opposing social and political forces. In the United States, privacy is sec-
ondary. In part, the explanation for the low value Americans attach to the 
legal concept of privacy is functional: protection against overweening 
state and market power is guaranteed by other means, including the radi-
cal fragmentation of state power in the American federalist and 
presidential system of government, and antitrust laws.3 But the difference 
is also one of basic values. Outside the core physical space of the home, 
Americans do not care particularly about privacy.4  
As a consequence, firms like Northwest that operate in an integrated 
transatlantic market must routinely come to terms with vastly different 
constitutions, laws, and regulatory systems. This Article takes a close 
look at the European side of the Atlantic, that is, the European regulation 
of corporations and other entities when they transfer the personal infor-
mation of their clients and employees outside the European Union. 
Under the EU Data Protection Directive (Directive), firms that collect 
personal information from European citizens must guarantee their pri-
vacy even once such personal information is sent outside the European 
                                                                                                                      
 2. Id.  
 3. The French case illustrates some of these functional considerations. The French 
legislation on information privacy was enacted in 1978 in response to what is known as the 
“Safari” episode. See Guy Braibant, Données personnelles et société de l’information : Trans-
position en droit français de la directive no. 95/46, 31 (1998) (on file with author). The daily 
newspaper “Le Monde” revealed the French government’s “Safari” plan to introduce a single 
personal identification number for all entries in government databases, thus permitting the 
“connection” of all such information on individual French citizens. In response, a government 
commission was established to examine the problem and a comprehensive information privacy 
law was passed. Id. Before the internet age, such an information scheme would not have been 
possible in the United States because, in the American constitutional system, government is 
not an economic actor in areas such as healthcare, and many government functions are carried 
out by state, not federal, government. See also David H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in 
Surveillance Societies 169–70 (1989). 
 4. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom 
in an Anxious Age (2004). 
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Union.5 National privacy authorities are responsible for enforcing these 
duties against firms operating in their territories, subject to an elaborate 
system of Europe-wide checks involving other national regulators and 
the European Commission (Commission).6 When foreign regulatory sys-
tems fail to afford the same privacy safeguards as exist in the European 
Union, the Commission has the power to negotiate with such countries 
to obtain improvements in their laws and regulations and hence allow the 
free, international flow of personal information.7 For firms that do busi-
ness globally, it is critical to understand the administration of European 
privacy law.8 
This examination of the European regulation of international data 
transfers is important for another reason. The European institutional 
framework for international data transfers is an example of what Anne-
Marie Slaughter calls “transgovernmental networks.”9 Such networks of 
national government officials are one of the principal forms of European 
governance. Ever since the European Community was founded in the 
1957, Member States have been reluctant to transfer government powers 
to central European institutions, preferring to leave implementation and 
enforcement of European norms to their national administrations. Yet 
governments have always understood that rough equivalence in imple-
menting rules and enforcement decisions is necessary for cooperation to 
succeed. Networks of national civil servants that develop common ad-
ministrative standards are the solution to this dilemma of national 
government power and European integration. According to Slaughter, the 
international realm is coming to resemble Europe. More and more, inter-
national cooperation in areas such as the environment and financial 
markets is occurring through networks of government regulators who 
                                                                                                                      
 5. Council and Eur. Parl. Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. 
(L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive or Directive]. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 67–78. The European Commission (Commis-
sion) is the EU’s executive branch. It is staffed by civil servants and headed by a President and 
College of Commissioners appointed by the Member States with the consent of the European 
Parliament. Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law 54–59 (3d ed. 2003). 
 7. Directive, supra note 5, at art. 25. 
 8. There are four important types of legal acts in the EU: treaties, European laws 
(which include what are known as Directives and Regulations), European implementing regu-
lations (which include what are known as implementing Directives and implementing 
Regulations), and European decisions. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, arts. 
I-33, I-34, I-37, 1994 O.J. (C 310) 1 [hereinafter Constitutional Treaty] (not yet ratified). The 
most important treaties are: the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, (the European Economic Community was renamed the “European 
Community” in 1992); the Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 
I.L.M. 253 [hereinafter the Maastricht Treaty]; and the Constitutional Treaty, supra, which 
would replace the other two but has not yet been ratified. 
 9. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 40, 43 (2004). 
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exchange information, develop common regulatory standards, and assist 
one another in enforcing such standards.10 By studying the case of the 
European privacy network, therefore, we gain perspective on a phe-
nomenon of growing importance not only in the European Union but 
throughout the world.  
The perspective offered by this Article is twofold. The emergence of 
transgovernmental networks gives rise to two questions, one causal and 
the other normative. First, how do we explain transnational cooperation 
through networks? Why do governments and regulators choose to estab-
lish networks rather than retain virtually limitless discretion over 
policymaking, conditioned only by international legal obligations? 
Based on my examination of the records of the intergovernmental nego-
tiations on the Data Protection Directive, I conclude that one pre-
condition for fettering national discretion through networks is common 
preferences among governments on the substance of the policy to be 
administered. Compared to other areas of European law, the Data Protec-
tion Directive gives surprisingly few powers to the European network of 
privacy regulators; the bargaining history shows that this decision was 
driven by extreme disagreement on the importance of privacy. While 
networks can generate harmonization of national policies, consensus 
among the participating regulators on the “problem” to be addressed by 
such policies is necessary for networks to spring to life. To explain that 
consensus we must look elsewhere, to the market, technology, the inter-
national aid that the North can promise the South, epistemic 
communities, and other causes of convergence. 
Second, how do transgovernmental networks fare when put to the 
normative test of respecting individual rights and guaranteeing the de-
mocratic accountability of bureaucrats to elected officials and the 
public? Modern understandings of legitimate public administration are 
inescapably tied to national experiences with democracy, yet that norma-
tive conceptual framework is confronted today with a novel form of 
radically disaggregated administration. Is the empirical reality of trans-
governmental networks compatible with basic principles of liberal 
democracy? Based on Italy’s experience with the European privacy net-
work, I argue that networks as codified in European law do not 
undermine significantly individual rights. Roughly speaking, Italian and 
European law guarantee participation, judicial review, the rule of law, 
and transparency. The administrative practice of the European privacy 
network, however, alters substantially the rights calculus. The regulation 
of international data transfers is characterized by informality and failure 
to act, forms of government action against which individuals generally 
                                                                                                                      
 10. Id. at 44–45. 
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cannot vindicate their rights in court. At least in the privacy case, there-
fore, rights suffer.  
More troubling is the fate of democratic accountability. The sharing 
of powers among national and supranational regulators in networks 
makes it difficult for national publics and parliaments to hold such regu-
lators accountable. Popular mobilization within one nation can control 
transgovernmental networks only if that nation is powerful enough to 
reject routinely the decisions that result from the network. In the Euro-
pean Union, no Member State has such power and, in the international 
realm, only the United States and certain European nations can claim 
that prerogative. Citizens, therefore, must be capable of mobilizing 
across national borders in the many different political communities in 
which transnational regulators operate. Yet, as documented in the schol-
arship on the democratic deficit in the European Union, overcoming 
national identities and setting the stage for vibrant democratic politics in 
transnational polities is no simple matter. If, as in the European privacy 
case, transgovernmental networks generate substantial inaction or infor-
mal action, the democratic deficit is particularly serious. In national 
systems, political accountability generally compensates for the inability 
of courts to police inaction and informal action; in the absence of trans-
national democratic mobilization, such accountability is weak in the 
European arena.  
The European Parliament’s vigorous efforts to stop the recent EU–
U.S. agreement on European airline passenger data suggests that the de-
mocratic future of European networks is not so bleak. When scholars 
speak of a democratic deficit in the European Union, they use the term to 
refer to two different phenomena. The first is the absence of the formal 
institutions of liberal democracy in European governance, a failure that 
can be traced to the system’s origins as an international organization. 
The second is the lack of a European identity that transcends national 
identities and that leads citizens to band together with citizens elsewhere 
in Europe to promote common causes, participate in European politics, 
and develop allegiances to their European governors. The airline passen-
ger data episode suggests that both sources of the democratic deficit 
might be overcome in the not too distant future.  
Since 1992, in response to the first democracy critique, the European 
Parliament has acquired significant powers. Among those powers is the 
right to deliberate and vote on non-binding resolutions regarding 
the administrative decisions of European networks.11 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                      
 11. Francesca E. Bignami, The Administrative State in a Separation of Powers 
Constitution: Lessons for European Community Rulemaking from the United States 
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fundamental rights are becoming an increasingly important element of 
the European legal order, as evidenced by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of 2000 and the Constitutional Treaty of 2004. Recently, the 
European Parliament asserted its new prerogative over administrative 
decisions and it did so to protect the European fundamental right to 
privacy: Parliament voted against a EU–U.S. agreement allowing 
transfers of passenger data to the United States for counter-terrorism 
purposes. Thus the concern that European decisions are made by 
technocrats, without the involvement of a directly elected legislative 
assembly, appears somewhat attenuated. Likewise, the mobilization of 
parliamentarians around a common, highly symbolic, European right to 
privacy suggests that gradually, through similar episodes, European 
Members of Parliament and their constituents might develop a shared 
identity. Yet even though this chapter in transatlantic relations is cause 
for optimism about European networks, it is also a reminder of the 
unfortunate tension between democracy and international cooperation. 
Europe’s new constitutional order might alleviate concerns of a 
democratic deficit in European transgovernmental networks, but it also 
might get in the way of international cooperation through other 
transgovernmental networks.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part One gives general background 
on European information privacy law and the different procedures and 
institutions that have been devised, in the fifty years since the European 
Community was first established, to implement and enforce European 
law. The focus then shifts to European networks, the similarities with 
transgovernmental networks, the specifics of the European information 
privacy network and their implementation into Italian law. Because the 
Data Protection Directive, like most European law, rests on implementa-
tion into national law and allows for significant discretion in how the 
Directive’s terms are implemented, it is virtually impossible to under-
stand European regulation of information privacy without considering 
national law. For reasons that I explain later, I have chosen the Italian 
case to bring this important national perspective to the analysis. 
Part Two reviews the experience to date with the regulation by net-
work of international data transfers. The next Part takes up the question 
of why governments establish networks and argues that the European 
privacy network was delegated very few powers because of radical dis-
agreement among the Member States over the right to privacy. In Part 
Four, the European privacy network is evaluated from the perspective of 
individual rights and democratic accountability. In light of the diversity 
                                                                                                                      
(Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 5/99, 1999), at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/ 
990502.html.  
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of liberal democratic traditions and the law of administration in those of 
traditions, Italian administrative law again serves as the point of refer-
ence. This assessment is divided into two sections: the European law of 
the privacy network, as it appears in the Data Protection Directive; and 
the administrative practice of the privacy network, which departs signifi-
cantly from the formal law. Finally, the Article reviews the recent 
transatlantic dispute over information privacy and the European Parlia-
ment’s important role in that dispute.  
I. The Regulation of Information Privacy 
A. European Information Privacy Policy  
What are the concerns and objectives that motivate the European 
regulators who interact in the privacy network? Laws regulating the col-
lection and use of personal information date back to the early 1970s, 
when computer technology was first widely used by government agen-
cies and large private organizations such as banks to gather, elaborate, 
and utilize personal data.12 These early national laws, European and 
American, were followed by two international instruments: the OECD 
Guidelines of 198013 and the Council of Europe Convention of 1981.14 In 
1990, negotiations on a European law began, and in 1995, many years 
and diplomatic fights later, the Data Protection Directive was adopted.15  
Even though the social and technological setting of information pri-
vacy laws has changed radically since the 1970s, many of the same 
concerns drive both the earlier and later generations of legislation. The 
most basic one, and an area in which little difference separates countries, 
is the danger of inaccurate personal information and the serious adverse 
                                                                                                                      
 12. These early laws include the Hessian Data Protection Act of 1970, the Swedish 
Data Act of 1973, the U.S Privacy Act of 1974, the German Federal Data Protection Act of 
1977, and French Law No. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 on computers, data files, and liberties. See 
Colin J. Bennett & Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instru-
ments in Global Perspective 102 (2003); Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr., Privacy & 
Human Rights: An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Developments 238–
44, 245–56, 474–79 (2003). For excellent comparative discussions of the early history of in-
formation privacy, see Colin J. Bennett, Regulating Privacy (1992) and Flaherty, 
supra note 3. 
 13. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data, OECD Doc. C 58 (Oct. 1, 1980). 
 14. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Eur. T.S. No. 108.  
 15. Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of 
Personal Data, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 445, 446 (1995)[hereinafter Simitis, From the Market to the 
Polis].  
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consequences that may follow.16 Wrong information in a database can 
lead to arrest, the denial of a loan application, and other injustices. Such 
errors can occur in a number of ways. The information may be recorded 
incorrectly in the electronic system to begin with. Personal information 
can become obsolete—an individual may have paid back her debts or 
been cleared of a criminal charge—and yet, once large organizations 
enter information into a database, they have few incentives to review and 
update such information.  
When personal information is used for purposes other than those for 
which it was collected originally or is combined with other data, col-
lected by another institution for another reason, the risk of inaccuracy 
increases exponentially. What is known as “data mining” magnifies the 
danger of inaccuracy because data is coded differently depending on the 
database and the purposes for which it is collected. In consolidating per-
sonal information, immense care must be taken to ensure that like is 
combined with like. A notorious example of this form of information 
abuse occurred in Sweden: a town attempted to root out welfare fraud in 
public housing grants by matching recipients’ names with their income 
figures as reported in other databases.17 About one thousand individuals 
came under suspicion of breaking the law. Yet, as it turned out, only one 
of them was actually guilty. The discrepancy in income figures had noth-
ing to do with welfare fraud but rather was the product of the different 
formulae used to calculate incomes in each of the databases.  
A second hazard that information privacy laws address, in both 
Europe and the United States, is the risk that personal information will 
fall into hands other than those for whom it was intended. This is the 
danger that an individual’s personal information—national identification 
number, credit card number, or bank account number—will be used by 
someone other than that individual to claim her government benefits, 
charge her credit card, or empty her bank account. Fraud is not the only 
risk of unsecured data. Stalkers and killers as well as thieves may obtain 
the information. For instance, the U.S. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 
199418 was enacted in response to the murder of actress Rebecca Shaffer 
by an obsessed fan who had obtained her address from the California 
Department of Motor Vehicles.19 
                                                                                                                      
 16. See generally Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Ra-
tionale, Logic, and Limits 145–50 (2002). 
 17. See id., at 106; Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 707, 718 (1987). 
 18. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2005). 
 19. See Edward J. Eberle, The Right to Information Self-Determination, 2001 Utah L. 
Rev. 965, 977 n.72 (2001).  
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The spectre of Big Brother is the last concern common to informa-
tion privacy regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. At the origins of the 
first information privacy laws was the fear that governments would use 
personal information to oppress their citizens and establish authoritarian 
regimes. The belief was that the many government agencies that collect 
information—welfare agencies, health authorities, the police—might 
combine their databases to monitor and control each and every citizen 
with whom they came into contact. As Alan Westin said in Privacy and 
Freedom, the book that served as one of the catalysts for information 
privacy laws in both the United States and Europe:  
In the area I have called data surveillance, the rapid pace of 
computer development and usage throughout American society 
means that vast amounts of information about individuals and 
private groups in the nation are being placed in computer-usable 
form. More and more information is being gathered and used by 
corporations, associations, universities, public schools, and gov-
ernmental agencies. And as “life-long dossiers” and interchange 
of information grow steadily, the possibilities increase that agen-
cies employing computers can accomplish heretofore impossible 
surveillance of individuals, businesses, and groups by putting 
together all the now-scattered pieces of data.20 
The current attempts of the U.S. government to identify terrorists by cre-
ating computer systems that would combine the information gathered by 
private businesses, local government, and federal agencies serve as a 
reminder that Westin’s warning, almost forty years later, must still be 
taken seriously.21 
A purely functional and universalist analysis of information privacy 
cannot reveal fully the motivations and objectives of European privacy 
policy. European and American concepts of privacy differ in important 
respects, a fact that has far-reaching consequences for their information 
privacy regulation. To explore these differences I will focus for the time 
being on German law. As I develop in greater detail later on, not only do 
Europeans and Americans differ on privacy but so too do European de-
mocracies. It is appropriate to single out Germany because it has one of 
the longest experiences with information privacy regulation and served 
as an important source of inspiration for the Data Protection Directive. 
                                                                                                                      
 20. Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom 366 (1967). 
 21. See Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 
Safeguarding Privacy in the Fight Against Terrorism viii (2004) (describing different 
government data mining programs). 
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Information privacy is rooted in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz).22 In 
1983, the Constitutional Court recognized the right to “informational 
self-determination” (informationelles Selbstbestimmungsrecht) based 
upon the rights to human dignity and the free development of personality 
set down in Articles One and Two of the Basic Law. Informational self-
determination can be translated as the right of control over one’s per-
sonal information. In Germany, therefore, information privacy is linked 
to a rich constitutional doctrine on a protected private sphere within 
which the individual can develop and flourish.23 The general law of hu-
man dignity and free development of personality seeks to protect 
individual autonomy from a variety of abusive state and private prac-
tices, ranging from discrimination based on race and sex, to attempts to 
influence consumer preferences. To that end, German information pri-
vacy law gives individuals the tools to control their personal information 
in a wide array of circumstances.24  
The legal concept of privacy that informs American information pri-
vacy law is narrower. The constitutional and common law of privacy 
focuses mainly on the physical places and personal facts which, if in-
vaded or disclosed, would offend common expectations of privacy.25 
While information privacy statutes are more comprehensive in their 
treatment of the problem, legislators are inevitably influenced by the 
background principles of the Constitution and the common law.  
Additionally, as with many other German constitutional rights, the 
Constitutional Court has held that the rights to dignity and personality 
upon which information privacy is based constitute both positive and 
negative rights.26 That is, the state is under a duty to protect and further 
the individual exercise of information privacy rights. The right to privacy 
is not simply a shield against intrusive state action, but a claim on the 
                                                                                                                      
 22. See Paul Schwartz, The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: 
Towards an American Right of Informational Self-Determination, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 675, 
676, 686–90, 701 (1989) (discussing German Constitutional Court case that established the 
right to informational self-determination). 
 23. See Axel Halfmeier, Country Report for Germany, Case No. 5, in The Common 
Core of European Private Law, Personality Rights in European Tort Law, 5 (Gert 
Bruggemeier & Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi eds., forthcoming) (on file with author); see also 
Edward J. Eberle, Dignity and Liberty: Constitutional Visions in Germany and the 
United States 256–66 (2002) (comparing German and American law of personality rights). 
 24. See Eberle, supra note 19, at 92 (discussing ramifications of the German constitu-
tional law on the statute); Flaherty, supra note 3, at 30–39 (discussing the different goals 
underpinning the German law).  
 25. See Westin, supra note 20, at 350; David A. Anderson, The Failure of American 
Privacy Law in Protecting Privacy 139, 139–67 (Basil S. Markesinis ed., 1999). 
 26. See Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany 312 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing obligation of the state to establish con-
ditions for the realization of the right to dignity).  
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state for affirmative, legislative action.27 The American tradition is differ-
ent in that rights are generally conceived as affording protection against 
government action. The Supreme Court does not interpret the Constitu-
tion to impose affirmative duties on government to pass legislation 
safeguarding individual rights like privacy.28 
Finally, in German law, all threats to dignity, personality, and infor-
mational self-determination are treated on roughly equal terms 
regardless of whether the offender is a public or private actor. No cate-
gorical distinction is drawn between the control and manipulation of 
persons which may occur in the public sector and that which may occur 
in the market and society. Dignity and personality rights can be invoked 
not only against state action but also against private information collec-
tion and surveillance.29 Likewise, the Federal Data Protection Law 
applies across-the-board to both the private and public sectors.30 That is 
not to say that the dangers posed by public and private uses of personal 
information are believed to be identical. German law recognizes that 
public entities are better positioned than private entities to collect, use, 
and misuse personal information; the law imposes more onerous duties 
on the public sector.31 
Unlike German law, U.S. law strictly separates invasions of privacy 
committed by the state from those perpetrated by corporations and other 
private sector entities. As with all rights, the Constitution only protects 
the right to privacy against state action. The common law of tort does not 
contain a strong right to privacy.32 The statutory protections enacted by 
Congress display a similar bias. While Congress passed the Privacy Act 
in 1974 to discipline the collection and use of information in all federal 
agencies, it has adopted private sector legislation sporadically and on a 
piecemeal basis, in reaction to particular privacy abuses in sectors of the 
                                                                                                                      
 27. See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 686. 
 28. Information privacy is protected under the Fourth Amendment provisions on unlaw-
ful searches and seizures and under the substantive due process guarantees of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. See Daniel J. Solove & Marc Rotenberg, Information Pri-
vacy Law 182–202, 275–322 (2003). 
 29. See, e.g., Amtsgericht Berlin-Mitte [Berlin Center District Court], Geschäftsnum-
mer [Docket No.] 16 C 427/02 (Dec. 18, 2003) (F.R.G.) (judgment on file with author) 
(holding for plaintiff in suit by pedestrian against Berlin department store for removal of sur-
veillance cameras based on Basic Law, Arts. 1 & 2, and Federal Data Protection Act 2001).  
 30. See Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr., supra note 12, at 246–48. 
 31. See Federal Ministry of the Interior, Federal Data Protection Act: An Implementa-
tion of Directive 95/46/EG (Feb. 18, 2002) (power point presentation on file with author). The 
new German legislation enacted in 2001 to implement the Data Protection Directive has equal-
ized somewhat the treatment of the public and private sectors. 
 32. See Anderson, supra note 25. 
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economy such as healthcare, the financial industry, and telecommunica-
tions.33  
The Data Protection Directive was heavily influenced by the  
German understanding of information privacy.34 European laws, unlike 
domestic ones, are generally drafted to accommodate multiple, long-
standing national policies in the area to be governed by the legislation. 
European laws often bring to mind a patchwork of different provisions 
and terms of art drawn from national laws and sewn together in Brussels 
rather than a coherent policy reflecting the will of a legislative majority. 
The Data Protection Directive is a clear example of this form of legisla-
tive drafting.35 At the time that the first proposal was published, seven of 
the then twelve Member States had information privacy laws: Denmark, 
Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom.36 The German and French models were highly influential be-
cause of their acknowledged role as trendsetters in the privacy field and 
because of the German and French origins of the officials charged with 
drafting the proposals.37  
The Directive promotes each of the objectives discussed earlier—
accuracy, defense against fraud, protection from government oppression, 
and informational self-determination—by imposing a number of general 
                                                                                                                      
 33. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.) (imposing requirements on financial institutions 
when collecting personal data); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
26 and 42 U.S.C.) (mandating protections for health privacy); Cable Communications Policy 
Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521–561, § 551 (protecting personal records kept by cable televi-
sion companies). See generally Solove & Rotenberg, supra note 28, at 563–66 (describing 
and assessing piecemeal regulation of information privacy). 
 34. The purpose of this discussion is to give some background on European informa-
tion privacy law, beyond the sometimes arid and abstract text of the Data Protection Directive. 
The claim, however, is not that German law was the only national experience to influence the 
Directive. The impact of most of the Member States that negotiated the Directive can be traced 
in one way or another. Further, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the Directive is not 
what in EU law is called a “complete harmonization directive.” That is, it sets minimum, not 
maximum, standards for information privacy. See Spiros Simitis, Data Protection in the Euro-
pean Union—The Quest for Common Rules, in 8 Collected Courses of the Academy of 
European Law 95, 111–115 (European Univ. Inst., Florence, Academy of European Law ed., 
1997) [hereinafter Simitis, Data Protection in the European Union]; Simitis, From the Market 
to the Polis, supra note 15, at 445, 463–64. Therefore, Member States could retain most ele-
ments of their pre-existing information privacy systems at the implementation phase even 
though some of those national systems were not expressly incorporated in the Directive. 
 35. See Simitis, From the Market to the Polis, supra note 15, at 449–50. 
 36. Commission Communication on the Protection of Individuals in Relation to the 
Processing of Personal Data in the Community and Information Security, [hereinafter Com-
munication on the Protection of Individuals]. 
 37. See Interview with Spiros Simitis, Professor of Labour, Civil, and Computer Sci-
ence and Law, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, in Frankfurt-Main, Germany (July 1, 
2003) (notes on file with author). 
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requirements on those who collect, use, and transfer personal informa-
tion. Personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully; personal 
information can be collected only for specific and legitimate purposes; 
the amount of information collected may not be excessive in relation to 
those purposes; personal data must be accurate; and information can be 
kept no longer than necessary to fulfill the original purpose of collec-
tion.38 The Directive then extensively elaborates on these basic 
principles. It specifies the information that must be provided to individu-
als when their data is collected,39 the types of personal information that 
may and may not be collected,40 the circumstances under which such 
information may be used,41 and the rights of individuals in checking on 
their information.42 These rights and duties apply to the private and pub-
lic sectors alike, although extensive exceptions are carved out for 
government use of personal information in areas such as national secu-
rity, domestic policing, foreign affairs, and defense.43 
B. Application and Enforcement of Information Privacy Law 
1. Modes of Implementing and Enforcing European Law 
Equipped with a basic understanding of the rationale and contents of 
European information privacy law, we can now turn to enforcement of 
privacy rights. European policymakers have devised a dizzying array of 
institutional arrangements for implementing the common policies set out 
in laws like the Data Protection Directive. Scholars traditionally identify 
two modes of European administration: administration of select policy 
areas such as competition law by the Commission (direct administration) 
and administration of the rest by Member States with little or no inter-
ference from above (indirect administration).44 The powers exercised by 
the Commission are unknown in other international regimes, given the 
reluctance in virtually every other part of the world to cede the sover-
eignty necessary to institute such a supranational body.45 The powers 
                                                                                                                      
 38. Directive, supra note 5, at art. 6. 
 39. Id. at arts. 11–12. 
 40. Id. at art. 8. 
 41. Id. at arts. 6–7. 
 42. Id. at arts. 12–14. 
 43. Id. at art. 13. 
 44. See Jürgen Schwarze, The Convergence of the Administrative Laws of the EU Mem-
ber States, in The Europeanisation of Law: The Legal Effects of European 
Integration 163, 165 & n.9 (Francis Snyder ed., 2000). 
 45. See Daniel Philpott, Westphalia, Authority, and International Society, 47 Pol. 
Stud. 566, 585 (1999); William Wallace, The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox, 
47 Pol. Stud. 503 (1999). The Secretariat of the World Trade Organization, for instance, only 
provides technical and logistical support to member countries and the Dispute Settlement 
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exercised by the Member States, however, are typical of most interna-
tional organizations—the World Trade Organization, the Council of 
Europe, and the Climate Change Convention, just to name a few.46 
Over the past couple of years, attention has shifted to a new set of 
institutions, procedures, and legal requirements designed to curb national 
discretion in the second form of European administration (indirect ad-
ministration).47 European legislation often imposes requirements on 
national authorities, such as independence from the executive branch and 
the duty to consult interest groups.48 Member States are subject to exten-
sive reporting duties49so that the Commission can monitor their track 
records on rulemaking and enforcement and, in extreme cases of non-
compliance, step in with proposals for new European legislation or with 
enforcement actions.50 A series of European agencies have been estab-
                                                                                                                      
Body, the WTO’s judicial body. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, art. 6, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round 
vol. I, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); Info. and Media Relations Div., World Trade Org., Un-
derstanding the WTO 107 (3d ed. 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/utw_chap7_e.pdf; Cf. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler 
Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements 2–28 (1995) (discussing limitations of classic international regimes in ensuring 
compliance). 
 46. In all international regimes, States are under a duty to implement the obligations 
undertaken in the governing treaties. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public Interna-
tional Law 12 (5th ed. 1998). 
 47. See The Europeanisation of Administrative Law: Transforming National 
Decision-Making Mechanisms (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2002). 
 48. For instance, the Framework Directive for telecommunications requires that na-
tional regulatory authorities be independent. See Council Directive 2002/21/EC on a Common 
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, art. 3, 2002 
O.J. (L 108) 33, 38 [hereinafter Framework Directive]. National administrations are required 
to consult the public when they undertake projects with possible environmental impacts. See 
Council Directive 85/337/EEC on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private 
Projects on the Environment, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40, when they regulate air and water quality, 
see Council Directive 96/61/EC Concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, 1996 
O.J. (L 257) 26, and when they regulate the telecommunications industry, see Framework 
Directive, supra, at art. 6. 
 49. Member States are, almost without fail, required to notify the Commission of the 
measures taken to implement Directives. See, e.g., Data Protection Directive, supra note 5, at 
art. 32.4. Examples of notification duties in the routine administration of European regulatory 
schemes include telecommunications, see Framework Directive, supra note 48, at art. 3, and 
public decency in television broadcasting, see Council Directive 97/36/EC Amending Council 
Directive 89/552/EEC on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regula-
tion or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television 
Broadcasting Activities, art. 23a, 1997 O.J. (L 202) 60. 
 50. For instance, in 1999, the Commission conducted an extensive review of the experi-
ence with European telecommunications regulation and proposed a series of new directives, 
which resulted in the passage of the Telecommunications Package in 2002. See Framework 
Directive, supra note 48; Council Directive 2002/20/EC on the Authorisation of Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 21; Council Directive 2002/19/EC 
on Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Networks and Associated 
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lished, not to replace domestic regulators, but to gather information for 
their use51 or to serve as an alternative to national agencies for firms dis-
satisfied with their national systems.52 
Lastly, in a number of areas including information privacy, European 
laws establish an elaborate sequence of national and supranational admin-
istrative decisions. In doing so, such laws routinize and legalize the 
networks of government officials that pervade European policymaking but 
that generally operate on an informal basis. In this procedure, which I 
shall refer to as “mixed administration”53 or “mixed procedure,” national 
authorities promulgate rules and bring enforcement actions but their deci-
sions are checked and, in some instances, reversed by the Commission and 
other Member States acting through comitology committees.54 Both na-
tional and European administrations share responsibility for a single 
determination of rights and duties under European law. The determination 
(to draw on categories familiar in systems of national administrative law) 
might be specific to an individual or firm, i.e., administrative adjudication, 
or generally applicable to a class of firms or individuals, i.e., administra-
tive rulemaking.  
This administrative architecture is highly unusual in national legal 
systems. It is unusual even when compared to a federal system like 
Germany in which legislative and administrative authority are usually 
divided between the federal government on the one hand and Länder 
                                                                                                                      
Facilities, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 7; Council Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal Service and Users’ 
Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 51. 
In the case of information privacy, the Commission conducted a review of national implement-
ing laws and regulations in 2002 and 2003 and decided against amending the existing 
European regulatory framework. See First Report on the Implementation of the Data Protec-
tion Directive (95/46/EC), COM(03)265 final at 7. An illustration of prosecutorial action is the 
Commission’s suit against France for failing to notify its implementing privacy legislation. 
Action Brought on 6 December 2000 by the Commission of the European Communities 
against the French Republic: Case C-449/00, 2001 O.J. (C 45) 11. 
 51. See Edoardo Chiti, Administrative Proceedings Involving European Agencies, 68 
Law & Contemp Probs. (forthcoming Winter 2004) (discussing European Environmental 
Bureau). 
 52. See id. (discussing European Medicines Agency). 
 53. See Francesca Bignami, Foreword to 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. (forthcoming 
Winter 2004); Sabino Cassese, European Administrative Proceedings, 68 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. (forthcoming Winter 2004); Sabino Cassese, Il diritto amministrativo europeo presenta 
caratteri originali?, 53 Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Pubblico 35, 44 (2003); Edoardo 
Chiti & Claudio Franchini, L’integrazione amministrativa europea (2003); Giacinto 
della Cananea, The European Union’s Mixed Administrative Proceedings, 68 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. (forthcoming Winter 2004). 
 54. For a description of comitology committees, see Bignami, supra note 11, at 7–13; 
Ellen Vos, Institutional Frameworks of Community Health and Safety Legisla-
tion: Committees, Agencies and Private Bodies 113 (1999). 
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governments on the other.55 In what is known as “vertical federalism,” 
the federal legislature passes laws but Länder governments are responsi-
ble for their day-to-day administration through enforcement decisions, 
the distribution of benefits, and the adoption of minor rules. Yet even in 
vertical federalism, government powers are split not shared. While the 
federal government has many tools for supervising Länder authorities, 
checking and possibly reversing individual administrative determinations 
is not one of them.56 
Rather, European networks and their legalization through mixed pro-
cedure resemble decisionmaking in the international sphere through what 
Anne-Marie Slaughter calls “transgovernmental networks.”57 What are the 
similarities? Slaughter defines networks as: “a pattern of regular and pur-
posive relations among like government units working across the borders 
that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the ‘domestic’ 
from the ‘international’ sphere.”58 In the case of transgovernmental net-
works, those government units are regulators—officials that staff national 
executive branches—and their relations are aimed at exchanging informa-
tion, improving enforcement, and harmonizing regulatory standards.59 
According to Kal Raustiala, Slaughter, and a number of other scholars, the 
design and effect of such networks is to create convergence among na-
tional regulatory systems as well as to improve compliance with norms set 
down in treaties and other international instruments.60 Slaughter contrasts 
networks with “traditional international organizations” like the World 
Trade Organization, where heads of state meet and sign treaties. She also 
paints networks as an alternative to a future world government “in which a 
set of global institutions perched above nation-states [enforce] global 
rules.”61 
European mixed procedure bears some of the same hallmark traits of 
transgovernmental networks: regulatory relations across national borders 
that have the purpose and effect of producing convergence in the day-to-
day interpretation and enforcement of European norms. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                      
 55. See generally David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 69–76 (1994). 
 56. Id. See also Peter Lerche, Principles of German Federalism in Germany and Its 
Basic Law: Past, Present and Future: A German-American Symposium 71, 76–77 (Paul 
Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).  
 57. Slaughter, supra note 9, at 40, 50. Slaughter recognizes the EU as one very im-
portant example of government by networks of ministers and regulators. With the exception of 
European agencies, however, she does not single out any particular form of European network. 
 58. Id. at 14. 
 59. See id. at 45–61. 
 60. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmen-
tal Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002); Slaughter, 
supra note 9, at 171–95. 
 61. Slaughter, supra note 9, at 6–7. 
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like transnational networks, mixed procedure is an alternative to the 
equivalent of “world government” in the European sphere, namely the 
concentration of implementation and enforcement powers in the hands of 
the European Commission (direct administration). Because of these 
common attributes—cooperation and harmonization without central 
government—we might expect that the reasons that give rise to mixed 
procedure in the European Union can also explain the emergence of 
transgovernmental networks in other regions of the world and globally. 
And because, in both European and transgovernmental networks, na-
tional regulators retain authority yet also belong to networks that 
condition how they exercise that authority, we can extrapolate from the 
normative consequences of mixed procedure to those of other transgov-
ernmental networks.  
Certain characteristics also set mixed procedure apart from generic 
transgovernmental networks. First, mixed procedure is a highly formal, 
legalized version of regulatory network. The law codifies the relationship 
between national and supranational officials by setting down a sequence 
comprised of national decision, notification to other national regulators 
and the Commission, and dispute resolution through a comitology com-
mittee should any of the other regulators disagree with the initial 
national decision. The law also specifies the network’s powers and the 
types of decisions to be issued. By contrast, the information-sharing and 
harmonization activities of regulators in global networks often occur on 
an informal basis, without a legal instrument setting down the proce-
dures and powers of the network.62 Often, but not always. As Slaughter 
demonstrates, many transgovernmental networks are created by interna-
tional treaty or executive agreement and are tasked with implementing the 
goals set down in the founding instrument; hence the law plays a similar 
role in their creation and operation as in European mixed procedure.63 Fur-
thermore, David Zaring shows that transgovernmental networks that start 
off as purely informal, ad hoc organizations over time can acquire a more 
formal basis: written rules of committee procedure, publication of the 
standards developed by the network, and procedures for consulting the 
public on such standards.64 Zaring focuses on the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissioners, but the same logic could very well drive the legalization 
of networks in other policy arenas. While, on the whole, law plays a 
                                                                                                                      
 62. Id. at 48 (describing International Organization of Securities Commissioners, Basel 
Committee, and International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement). 
 63. Id. at 45–48, 153–54. 
 64. See David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administra-
tion, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 10,18, on file with author). 
BIGNAMI TYPE.DOC 5/10/2005  9:16 AM 
824 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 26:807 
 
greater role in mixed procedure than in generic transgovernmental net-
works, this difference is not as significant as it appears at first glance. 
A more important and fundamental difference between mixed proce-
dure and other regulatory networks is the existence of authoritative 
supranational institutions in Europe that can resolve differences over the 
interpretation and application of the law governing the network. The 
European Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Court of First In-
stance are without equivalents in other regional or international regimes. 
As I have argued elsewhere, it is important to avoid exaggerating their 
powers in light of their limited resources, the incremental process through 
which their authority is being established, and the persistence of national 
administrative and judicial autonomy.65 Nonetheless, the Commission and 
the European Courts are extraordinary institutions when compared to the 
institutions of international regimes; therefore, rights and duties under the 
law of European networks bind officials and citizens in a way that those 
set down in the law of global networks cannot.  
2. Administration of Information Privacy Law 
The application and enforcement of European information privacy 
law rests exclusively on indirect administration. The Commission does 
not have power to elaborate and enforce directly the provisions of the 
Data Protection Directive. The Directive, however, contains many of the 
institutional devices discussed earlier to curb national discretion in indi-
rect administration. A number of provisions facilitate the development of 
common privacy norms and enforcement practices throughout the Euro-
pean Union. The Directive requires that each Member State establish, if 
not already in place, an independent privacy authority.66 That government 
body is at the heart of an elaborate system laid down in the Directive for 
the enforcement of privacy rights. The independent privacy authority 
must establish a notification system for certain types of data processing 
operations; vet data processing operations that pose special risks to pri-
vacy through a licensing system; enforce information privacy law 
through inspections and administrative actions against suspected offend-
ers; and receive complaints alleging the breach of privacy rights from 
individuals or associations that represent such individuals.67 Furthermore, 
national privacy regulators are to encourage corporations and other enti-
                                                                                                                      
 65. See Francesca Bignami, The Challenge of Cooperative Regulatory Relations after 
Enlargement, in Law and Goverance in an Enlarged European Union 97 (George A. 
Bermann & Katherina Pistor eds., 2004) 
 66. Directive, supra note 5, at art. 28 (Supervisory authority). 
 67. Id. at art. 18 (Obligation to notify the Supervisory authority), art. 19 (Contents of 
notification), art. 20 (Prior checking), art. 28 (Supervisory authority). 
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ties that deal in personal information to develop codes of conduct.68 
Moving to the Directive’s provisions on national judiciaries, individuals 
must be able to go to court to vindicate their information privacy rights 
and they must be compensated fully for the damage suffered.69 
The Data Protection Directive also employs mixed procedure to fet-
ter national discretion. This it does in one limited area of application and 
enforcement of European privacy law: international data transfers. Under 
the Directive, Member States must ensure that when personal informa-
tion is transferred to third countries (countries outside the European 
Union), those countries provide “an adequate level of protection” for 
information privacy. Adequacy is assessed by reference to the rights 
guaranteed under European information privacy law.70 A mixed proce-
dure is triggered in two distinct circumstances: a national privacy 
authority decides to block a transfer because it finds that a third country 
fails to ensure an adequate level of protection;71 or, conversely, a national 
privacy authority decides to permit a transfer to an inadequate country 
(inadequate according to the national privacy authority) because special 
protections are in place.72 
Consider the example of a country with widespread identity theft 
because its regulators fail to require security measures of information 
users. In the first type of mixed procedure, a national privacy authority 
that discovered the problem would be obliged to make a finding of in-
adequacy and block transfers of personal information to that country. 
The same privacy authority would be required to report its finding to the 
Commission, which in turn could initiate action to block data transfers to 
that country in all Member States or could enter into negotiations with 
that country with the intent of improving its privacy guarantees.73 The 
Directive contemplates a Commission decision of adequacy upon com-
pletion of the negotiations, which would be valid in all Member States. 
In theory and in practice, however, the Commission adequacy determina-
tion can come at any time and not necessarily as the product of bilateral 
negotiations. Both courses of Commission action are entirely discretion-
ary. Even though a Member State may find that citizens’ privacy rights 
are abused by a third country, the Commission may or may not require 
that other Member States also block transfers of personal information to 
that third country and may or may not enter into negotiations with that 
                                                                                                                      
 68. Id. at art. 27. 
 69. Id. at art. 22 (Remedies), art. 23 (Liabilities). 
 70. Id. at art. 25.1. 
 71. Id. at art. 25. 
 72. Id. at art. 26. 
 73. Id. at art. 25.3–25.5. 
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third country.74 Furthermore, both decisions may be initiated by the 
Commission alone, not exclusively by the Member States, and therefore 
they do not represent necessarily the culmination of a mixed procedure.75 
The second type of mixed procedure involves the decision to allow 
transfers of personal information to inadequate third countries. Even if a 
third country does not guarantee an adequate level of privacy protection, 
Member States may authorize transfers on six separate grounds listed in 
the Data Protection Directive.76 Those grounds are: (1) the individual has 
consented “unambiguously” to the proposed transfer of her personal in-
formation; (2) the transfer is necessary for performance of a contract 
between the individual and the business; (3) the transfer of the personal 
information is necessary for the entry into or performance of a contract 
between the business and a third party for the individual’s benefit; 
(4) the transfer is justified on “important public interest grounds” or for 
purposes of a lawsuit; (5) the transfer of the personal information is nec-
essary to protect the “vital interests” of the individual; or (6) the transfer 
is from a database to which the public routinely has access because of 
national laws on access to documents. Member States are permitted to 
authorize transfers on additional grounds, not specifically enumerated in 
the Directive, but in such cases they must notify the Commission and the 
other Member States.77 In the example of a country with an identity theft 
problem, a Member State might decide to permit a transfer if a contract 
between the corporation and the receiving party renders that party liable 
in tort for any loss or theft of the personal information. Such a decision 
would have to be notified to the Commission and the other Member 
States.78 If either the Commission or another Member State objected to 
the transfer, the matter would be taken up by the Commission, which 
would make the final decision on whether to permit the transfer.79 
                                                                                                                      
 74. The Commission’s citizen rights guide explains the procedure in the following 
manner: 
Where a non-EU country does not ensure an adequate level of protection, the Direc-
tive requires the blocking of specific transfers. Member States must inform the 
Commission of any such blocking measures, and this triggers a Community proce-
dure to ensure that any Member State’s decision to block a particular transfer is 
either extended to the EU as a whole, or reversed. 
European Commission, Data Protection in the European Union 12, at: http:// 
europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/guide/guide-ukingdom_en.pdf 
 75. Directive, supra note 5, at art. 25, 26.4 (giving Commission as well as Member 
States the right of initiative). 
 76. Id. at art. 26.1. 
 77. Id. at art. 26.2–26.3. 
 78. Id. at art. 26. 
 79. Id. at art. 26.3. 
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In both types of mixed procedure, the Commission must act together 
with a comitology committee of Member State representatives and must 
seek the opinion of a working party of national privacy authorities.80 In 
other words, the Commission does not act alone but rather must respect 
the preferences of national regulators responsible for information privacy 
in the Member States. The role of the comitology committee is typical of 
virtually all areas in which the Commission is delegated powers of im-
plementation by the Council and Parliament. The working party of 
national privacy authorities, on the other hand, is fairly unusual and re-
flects the decision in favor of independent regulators to enforce privacy 
rights at the national level. Hence the need to incorporate their expertise 
and preferences at the European level through a committee of their own. 
Such committees exist in only a handful of other European policy areas 
such as securities and telecommunications.81 
3. Italian Implementation 
To understand and evaluate the European regulation of information 
privacy, it is important to consider national laws and institutions. The 
Data Protection Directive, like all directives, does not have immediate 
effect but requires that the Member States pass implementing laws. Like 
the vast majority of directives, it leaves the Member States with consid-
erable discretion as to how to implement its provisions. On the ground, 
both the substantive and procedural guarantees contained in the Directive 
vary considerably from one Member State to another. The normative 
assessment of European networks, which comes in Part Four of the Arti-
cle, also depends on the Member State. European democracies have 
developed different laws to guarantee rights and democratic accountabil-
ity in government by bureaucrats. Thus the liberal democratic tradition 
and the challenge posed to that tradition by the plural, fragmented world 
of European regulatory networks vary considerably from one country to 
the next. 
To fully explore these questions, I examine the Italian case. A num-
ber of criteria informed the choice of Italy as the national case. First, 
                                                                                                                      
 80. Id. at arts. 30.1(b), 31. The committee of Member State representatives is a man-
agement committee, meaning that a qualified majority of the national regulators on the 
committee is required to oppose a Commission decision and send the decision to the Council 
for a vote. In regulatory committees, by contrast, only a blocking minority of national regula-
tors is necessary to force the Commission to send the decision to the Council. In other words, 
in the data protection area, national regulators on the committee influence the Commission but 
not to the same extent as they do in fields with regulatory committees. 
 81. See Rosa M. Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Su-
pervision in Europe, 10 Colum. J. Eur. L. 49, 62 (2003) (securities); David Lazer & Viktor 
Mayer-Schönberger, Governing Networks: Telecommunication Deregulation in Europe and 
the United States, 27 Brook. J. Int’l L. 819, 847–49 (2002) (telecommunications). 
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Italy has the longest experience with the Data Protection Directive. It 
was the first Member State to pass implementing legislation, back in 
1996, well before the deadline for implementation expired.82 Second, 
Italian law is representative of the many Member States whose adminis-
trative law was influenced by the Napoleonic model in which a 
specialized court reviews administrative action (the droit administratif 
tradition).83 Third, my knowledge of the Italian language enabled me to 
examine directly the legal sources and therefore rendered the case study 
not only more manageable but also more rigorous. 
In implementing the Directive, the Italian government chose to 
minimize the notification and authorization components of the regula-
tory scheme.84 Corporations, government agencies, and other entities are 
not required, for the most part, to submit their information collection and 
analysis operations to the Italian privacy authority (Garante per la pro-
tezione dei dati personali or Garante) for review and approval before 
such operations may commence. The privacy rights and duties set down 
in the Italian legislation operate as standards that data users are expected 
to follow or else risk administrative injunctions and fines, criminal 
prosecutions, and civil actions.85  
The Italian regulatory scheme’s reliance on legal duties and sanc-
tions rather than licensing and screening applies to international data 
                                                                                                                      
 82. Legge 31 dicembre 1996 n. 675, Tutela delle persone e di altri soggetti rispetto al 
trattamento dei dati personali [Law No. 675 of Dec. 31, 1996, Protection of Individuals and 
Other Subjects with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data], Gazz. Uff., no. 5 (Jan. 8, 
1997) (Italy). Subsequent to the enactment of this legislation a number of significant amend-
ing regulations were promulgated. See Decreto Legislative 26 febbraio 1999 n. 51 [Decree-
Law No. 51 of Feb. 26, 1999], Gazz. Uff., no. 56 (Mar. 9, 1999) (Italy); Decreto Legislativo 
28 dicembre 2001 n. 467 [Decree-Law No. 467 of Dec. 28, 2001], Gazz. Uff., no. 5 (Jan. 8, 
1997) (Italy). In 2003, the entire corpus of legislation was systematized and modified slightly 
in the Personal Data Protection Code. See Decreto Legislativo 30 giugno 2003 n. 196, Codice 
in materia di protezione dei dati personali [Decree-Law No. 196 of June 30, 2003, Personal 
Data Protection Code], Gazz. Uff., no. 174 (July 29, 2003) (Italy). 
 83. Those Member States include France, Spain, Greece, and Belgium. See John 
Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems 
of Western Europe and Latin America (2d ed. 1985); L. Neville Brown & John S. 
Bell, French Administrative Law 1–8 (5th ed. 1998). 
 84. For the original requirements enacted in 1996, see Law No. 675 of Dec. 31, 1996, 
art. 7 (notification) and art. 22.1 (authorization). For the current requirements, see Decree-Law 
No. 196 of June 30, 2003, Personal Data Protection Code, at art. 26 (authorization for private 
sector use of sensitive data). 
 85. Personal Data Protection Code, at arts. 141–72. On the differences among Member 
States, the British case is instructive. The UK, unlike Italy, requires notification for many 
classes of personal information but does not require prior authorization. Moreover, the British 
Information Commissioner has the power to enjoin illegal personal information operations but 
does not have the power to impose administrative fines for the initial breach of privacy law. 
See Heather Rowe, Data Protection Act 1998: A Practical Guide 95–103 (notifica-
tion), 117–22 (enforcement powers) (1999). 
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transfers. Corporations and other entities are bound by the duty to stop 
transfers of personal information to inadequate third countries:  
[I]t shall be prohibited to transfer personal data that are the sub-
ject of processing from the State’s territory to countries outside 
the European Union, temporarily or not, and in any form and by 
any means whatsoever, if the laws of the country of destination 
or transit of the data do not ensure an adequate level of protec-
tion of individuals. Account shall also be taken of the methods 
used for the transfer and the envisaged processing operations, 
the relevant purposes, nature of the data and security measures.86 
If the Garante suspects that a corporation or other entity has 
breached this duty, it may undertake an investigation and impose certain 
restrictions on, or block altogether, future international data transfers of 
the same type.87 Failure to comply with the Garante’s administrative in-
junction can lead to criminal prosecution and imprisonment of three 
months to two years.88 Moreover, individuals harmed by the transfer of 
their personal information in violation of the law may sue for material 
damages and emotional distress (danni non-patrimoniali) and may claim 
compensation for emotional distress regardless of whether they can also 
show physical or economic harm.89 Lastly, in extreme cases, the Garante 
can refer breaches to the public prosecutor directly, without first taking 
administrative action, and the public prosecutor may bring a criminal 
action against the offending corporation for imprisonment between one 
and three years.90 Any administrative or judicial decision to impose a 
sanction for transfer of personal information to an inadequate third coun-
try would have to be notified to the European Commission under the 
Data Protection Directive and could give rise to the mixed procedure 
described earlier.91 
Tracking the Directive, the Italian law enumerates exceptions to the 
ban on transfers to third countries with inadequate privacy safeguards.92 
The Italian legislation also provides that the Garante may allow such 
transfers on grounds other than those specifically enumerated in the 
                                                                                                                      
 86. Personal Data Protection Code, at art. 45. 
 87. Id. at arts. 143, 150, 154. 
 88. Id. at art. 170. 
 89. Id. at art. 15. See also S.S. Sica, Le tutele civili, in Il codice dei dati personali: 
Temi e problemi 541 (Francesco Cardarelli et al. eds., 2004) (explaining system of tortious 
liability for infringement of privacy rights). 
 90. Personal Data Protection Code, at art. 167.2. 
 91. Directive, supra note 5, at arts. 25–26; see also supra text accompanying notes 72–
79.  
 92. Id. at art. 43. 
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legislation, such as privacy-protecting contractual terms.93 These 
exceptions can come either in the form of an individual authorization 
(autorizzazione), giving the corporation assurances in advance of a 
particular transfer that the Garante will not take enforcement action, or 
in the form of a block authorization (autorizzazione generale), 
permitting certain classes of transfers94 Under the Data Protection 
Directive, such exceptions must be notified to the European Commission 
and could give rise to the mixed procedure outlined above. 
II. Experience with the Regulation of 
International Data Transfers  
To date, the Commission has issued adequacy decisions for five 
countries and two territories of the UK: Hungary, Switzerland, the 
United States, Canada, Argentina, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man.95 In the 
case of the two decisions applicable to the United States, the adequacy 
findings apply not to the overall regulatory framework for privacy but to 
the transfer of airline passenger data to the U.S. government and to cer-
tain “Safe Harbor Principles” which, if adopted by firms, guarantee 
compliance with the Directive’s requirements. The Commission has also 
issued two decisions specifying standard contract clauses which, if 
adopted by the parties to a data transfer, guarantee privacy rights regard-
less of the public regulatory regime.96 The Garante implemented most of 
the earlier Commission decisions through block authorizations (autoriz-
zazioni generali). Firms and public entities that export to Hungary, 
Switzerland, Canada, Argentina, or the United States (respecting the 
                                                                                                                      
 93. Id. at art. 44. 
 94. Id. at arts. 40–41. Authorizations are a standard form of administrative action in 
Italy. See, e.g., Aldo Sandulli, Il Procedimento, in 2 Trattato di Diritto Amministrativo: 
Diritto Amministrativo Generale 1035, 1271 (Sabino Cassese ed., 2d ed. 2003). 
 95. Commission Decision 2000/519/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 4 (Hungary); Commission 
Decision 2000/518/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 1 (Switzerland); Commission Decision 
520/2000/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7 (U.S. Safe Harbor Principles); Commission Decision 
2004/535/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11 (transfers of airline passenger data to U.S. government); 
Commission Decision 2002/2/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 2) 13 (Canada); Commission Decision 
2003/490/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 168) 19 (Argentina); Commission Decision 2003/821/EC, 2003 
O.J. (L 308) 27 (Guernsey); Commission Decision 2004/411/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 151) 48 (Isle of 
Man). 
 96. Commission Decision 2001/497/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 181) 19; Commission Decision 
2002/16/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 6) 52. The first standard contract contains terms on the duties of 
information exporting firms and those of information importing firms; individuals whose 
personal information is transferred have a right to sue to enforce the contract, as third-party 
beneficiaries. The second standard contract contains similar terms but applies in cases in 
which a third country firm processes data on the behalf of an information exporting firm. See 
generally, Christopher Kuner, European Data Privacy Law and Online Business 
146–56 (2003). 
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Safe Harbor Principles) or that include the standard clauses in their con-
tracts (regardless of destination country) can rest assured that they are in 
compliance with Italian information privacy law. The Garante has not yet 
issued block authorizations for some of the more recent Commission 
decisions. Nevertheless, corporations and other entities can transfer air-
line passenger data to the U.S. government and all classes of personal 
information to Argentina, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man because, under 
European law, individuals may rely on Commission decisions even in the 
absence of an Italian implementing act.97  
In addition, the working party of European privacy authorities, es-
tablished under Article 29 of the Directive, has issued a number of 
opinions which have not yet resulted in Commission adequacy determi-
nations. In one recent opinion, the working party approved of the 
Australian government’s system of privacy for airline passenger data 
and, most likely, a Commission adequacy decision will follow.98 In the 
other opinions, the working party expressed reservations about the for-
eign privacy regimes under consideration and the Commission is 
engaged in bilateral negotiations to obtain additional safeguards in those 
countries. One involves the general regulation of information privacy in 
Australia.99 The other concerns Canada’s protection of airline passenger 
data when transferred to the government for purposes of surveillance and 
counter-terrorism measures.100 
When the Data Protection Directive was first drafted, Member States 
expected that, initially, national government officials would assess pri-
vacy in third countries and then, over time, any dissatisfaction would 
percolate up to the Commission. As they said in the negotiations on the 
Directive: 
[This Article] gives a certain degree of flexibility to the Member 
States. Initially, it is for them to decide, following procedures that 
they will choose themselves, on the adequate level of protection in 
                                                                                                                      
 97. See Craig & de Búrca, supra note 6, at 189 (describing direct effect of decisions). 
 98. See Opinion 1/2004 on the Level of Protection Ensured in Australia for the Trans-
mission of Passenger Name Record Data From Airlines, Op. Working Party on the Prot. of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Pers. Data, 10031/03/EN WP 85 (Jan. 16, 2004) 
(approving Australian system of protection of airline passenger data). 
 99. See Opinion 3/2001 on the Level of Protection of the Australian Privacy Amend-
ment (Private Sector) Act 2000, Op. Working Party on the Prot. of Individuals with Regard to 
the Processing of Pers. Data, 5095/00 WP 40 final (Jan. 26, 2001). The Commission is negoti-
ating with Australia to secure additional privacy safeguards. E-mail from European 
Commission, DG Markt, Unit Data Protection (Dec. 18, 2002) (on file with author). 
 100. See Opinion 3/2004 on the Level of Protection Ensured in Canada for the Transmis-
sion of Passenger Name Records and Advanced Passenger Information from Airlines, Op. 
Working Party on the Prot. of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Pers. Data, 
10037/04/EN WP 88 (Feb. 11, 2004). 
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third countries, taking into account certain criteria enumerated in 
[Article 25.2]. In a later phase, a Community procedure will be 
launched in order to ensure a common approach which is well-
structured in this area.101 
Yet these expectations have not been met. In neither type of mixed 
procedure have national regulators been active in specifying the condi-
tions for data transfers to particular third countries and in blocking 
transfers that fail to satisfy such conditions.  
No Member State has ever notified the Commission, pursuant to Ar-
ticle 25 of the Directive, of a decision to block a data transfer because of 
adequacy problems.102 Each of the Commission adequacy decisions sur-
veyed above was initiated not by a Member State but rather by the 
Commission or the third country itself.103 Therefore the first type of 
mixed procedure established under the Data Protection Directive is, in 
practice, a dead letter.  
The second type of mixed procedure, the authorization of transfers 
to inadequate third countries, has seen more use but still is insignificant 
in light of the volume of trade with countries lacking information privacy 
legislation altogether or with less extensive safeguards for privacy rights. 
According to figures reported in December 2002, over four years after 
the Directive had come into force, national authorities had notified the 
Commission on seventeen occasions of special authorizations permitting 
personal information to be exported to inadequate third countries.104 
Most of these notifications involved contracts that, according to the na-
tional privacy regulator, guaranteed individual privacy rights. Spain was 
the most active, with eight notifications, followed by Finland with four, 
                                                                                                                      
 101. Council Doc. 9957/94, Rapport du Groupe des questions économiques (Protection 
des données) en date des 6/7 octobre 1994 au Comité des Représentants Permanents [Report 
of Working Party on Economic Questions (Data Protection) dating from Oct. 6–7, 1994 to the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives, Brussels], 12 (Oct. 18, 1994) (on file with author). 
 102. E-mail from European Commission, DG Markt, Unit Data Protection (Nov. 17, 
2004) (on file with author); E-mail from European Commission, DG Markt, Unit Data Protec-
tion (Dec. 18, 2002) (on file with author). 
 103. In the case of Argentina, the Argentine government sought an adequacy decision 
from the Commission. See Opinion 4/2002 on the level of protection of personal data in Ar-
gentina, Op. Working Party on the Prot. of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Pers. 
Data, MARKT 11081/02/EN WP 63, at 2 (Oct. 3, 2002). The Commission initiated adequacy 
proceedings for Switzerland and Hungary because both had ratified the Council of Europe 
Convention, thus providing prima facie evidence of adequacy, and both showed some interest 
in obtaining adequacy decisions. In the case of Canada and the United States, both govern-
ments initiated discussions with the Commission with an eye to avoiding trade disruptions. 
See e-mail from European Commission, DG Markt, Unit Data Protection (Dec. 18, 2002) (on 
file with author). 
 104. E-mail from European Commission, DG Markt, Unit Data Protection (Dec. 18, 
2002) (on file with author). 
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Portugal with three, and Germany and the Netherlands each with one. 
None of these notifications, however, resulted in further action at the 
European level, since neither the Member States nor the Commission 
raised objections that would trigger a comitology procedure. 
In 2003, the Commission recognized that the enforcement of Euro-
pean privacy rights in the international trade context was disappointing. 
In a report on the implementation of the Data Protection Directive, the 
Commission criticized national privacy authorities. According to the re-
port, “[m]any unauthorised and possibly illegal transfers are being made 
to destinations or recipients not guaranteeing adequate protection.”105 
The Commission called the number of notifications under the second 
type of mixed procedure, i.e., transfers to countries without adequate 
privacy laws, “derisory by comparison with what might reasonably be 
expected.”106 It believed that transfers to countries without adequate pri-
vacy safeguards were being made and that national authorities had failed 
to clamp down, either by prohibiting the potentially illegal transfers or 
by requiring special guarantees. In a subsequent letter, the Commission 
urged national privacy authorities to ensure that authorizations allowing 
export of personal information to inadequate third countries were noti-
fied to the Commission and other Member States.107 In other words, the 
Commission called upon national regulators to put into practice the sec-
ond type of mixed procedure foreseen in the Directive. The Commission 
identified three related goals: improving the level of protection for Euro-
peans’ personal information outside the European Union; increasing 
awareness among national regulators and the Commission of the circum-
stances surrounding third country transfers; and facilitating the exchange 
of best practices when personal information is sent to inadequate third 
countries.108 
Since the Commission issued the letter, notifications have improved 
slightly. Between August 2003 and October 2004, thirty-three transfers 
to countries without adequate information privacy safeguards were ap-
proved by national authorities and notified to the Commission.109 Over 
the period of one year, thirty-three notifications is considerable when 
                                                                                                                      
 105. Report from the Commission: First Report on the Implementation of the Data Pro-
tection Directive (95/46/EC), COM(2003) 265 final at 19. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Note from European Commission Internal Market DG to Member States and Data 
Protection Authorities, MARKT/E4/LCN/ck D (2003) 270 (Aug. 21, 2003), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/lawreport/notification-art-26_en.pdf. 
 108. Id. 
 109. E-mail from European Commission, DG Markt, Media and Data Protection Unit 
(Nov. 17, 2004) (on file with author). Some of the notifications involved multiple companies 
within the same parent company and therefore the actual number of authorizations granted by 
national privacy authorities is slightly higher. 
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compared with the seventeen notifications from the previous four years. 
Yet in light of the volume of trade between the European Union and the 
rest of the world, much of which does not follow the European approach 
to information privacy, it is still difficult to believe that Europeans’ pri-
vacy is protected when their data is transferred abroad.  
III. Explaining Networks 
Why do government regulators decide to forego exclusive power 
over policy decisions and join networks? For even though networks are 
not as constraining as a hypothetical world government, they nonetheless 
curb national autonomy and limit sovereignty. By creating the expecta-
tion that their officials will reveal their national policies and enforcement 
practices and will cooperate with other officials by assisting foreign en-
forcement actions and adopting “best practice” regulatory standards, 
governments renounce unilateral control over policymaking in their terri-
tories. To translate the question into the European context: Why, when 
Member States draft European legislation, do they establish networks, 
i.e., mixed procedure, rather than retain powers of implementation for 
themselves, i.e., classic indirect administration? This section develops an 
explanation for the European privacy case by drawing on the theory of 
European integration and records from the negotiation of the Data Pro-
tection Directive. The section concludes by developing the implications 
for transgovernmental networks beyond Europe.  
A. The European Privacy Network 
The European privacy network has remarkably few powers and re-
sponsibilities under the Data Protection Directive.110 The network is 
tasked only with administering international data transfers. Yet the Data 
Protection Directive seeks to protect information privacy and regulate 
information collection, analysis, and transfer in a vast array of economic 
sectors and areas of government activity. Any number of areas of na-
tional application of the Directive could have benefited from the 
harmonizing effect of a European network.111 The Directive could have 
                                                                                                                      
 110. The point of comparison is other fields such as food safety and telecommunications 
and the powers that might be expected given the objective need for harmonization in the in-
formation privacy field. 
 111. In fall 2002, the Commission called for comments on the implementation of the Data 
Protection Directive. The companies and trade associations that responded were unanimous in 
calling for greater uniformity among the Member States in their application of the Directive. See 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie & Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberver-
bände, Joint Position on the Online Consultation by the European Commission (DG Internal 
Market) on Application of Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (Sept. 4, 2002), available at 
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required the Member States to notify the Commission of national rules 
governing matters such as the conditions for obtaining individual con-
sent to the collection of personal information and could have allowed the 
Commission, acting together with other Member States, to object.112 
Countries that require authorization for sensitive data could have been 
required to notify the Commission and other Member States when they 
granted or denied authorizations, as is the case for genetically modified 
organisms.113 The same type of procedure could have been put into place 
for national investigations and sanctions, as exists in food safety law114 
and competition law.115 After all, a corporation alleged to have breached 
privacy rights in one Member State might very well have breached them 
elsewhere, in which case the duty to inform is vital. Or in the absence of 
Commission notification, the same investigation might be undertaken in 
                                                                                                                      
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/bda_en.pdf (calling for 
greater uniformity on the question of whether personal data covers both natural persons and 
firms, on conditions for obtaining consent, on a firm’s place of establishment for purposes of 
determining applicable law, and on notification procedures); Confederation of British Industry, 
Comments on Directive 95/46 re data protection (Aug. 30, 2002), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/cbi_en.pdf (calling for 
greater uniformity on obtaining consent); Covington & Burling, Comments on Implementation 
and Application of the 1995 Data Protection Directive, available at http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/covington-burling_en.pdf (recommending 
uniformity in the definitions of personal data and establishment and calling for a greater role of 
the art. 29 working party in eliminating inconsistent interpretations at the national level); Prof. 
Dr. Büllesbach, Chief Data Protection Officer, Daimler Chrysler, Presentation before the Euro-
pean Commission (Sept. 30, 2002) (calling for uniformity on question of whether Directive 
protects both natural persons and firms, consent, sensitive data, establishment, notification re-
quirements, and third country transfers); UNICE, Implementation of Directive 95/46/EC on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data of 24 October 1995 (August 30, 2002) available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
internal_market/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/unice_en.pdf (calling attention to disparities in 
levels of data protection generally and definitions of consent and sensitive data in particular). 
 112. Such notification duties are common in European law. For instance, Member States 
are required to notify the Commission of new technical standards for industrial goods, and the 
Commission or other Member States may object on the grounds that they create barriers to 
trade which are not justified for legitimate public policy reasons. See Council Directive 
83/189/EEC, arts. 8–9, 1983 O.J. (L 109) 8. 
 113. See Damian Chalmers, Risk, Anxiety and the European Mediation of the Politics of 
Life: The European Food Safety Authority and the Government of Biotechnology, Paper pre-
sented to the Harvard European Law Association 4–6 (Oct. 29, 2004), http:// 
www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hela/papers/chalmerssocialregulation112.doc. 
 114. In the event of an outbreak of disease in livestock, national authorities must take 
protective measures and notify the Commission and other Member States. If the Commission 
or other Member States find the measures inadequate, the matter goes to a comitology proce-
dure, and more protective measures may be adopted. See Council Directive 90/425/EEC, art. 
10, 1990 O.J. (L 224) 29. 
 115. Commission Notice on Cooperation between National Competition Authorities and 
the Commission in Handling Cases Falling within the Scope of Articles 85 or 86 of the EC 
Treaty, point 49, 1997 O.J. (C 313) 3. 
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multiple jurisdictions, creating the risk of conflicting administrative and 
judicial decisions and the duplication of efforts. 
Why, then, were so few powers delegated to the European privacy 
network? A number of political scientists have examined the institutional 
choices made in the Treaties and in European laws.116 Their research has 
addressed several questions of institutional design: the decision in the 
founding Treaties to delegate powers of proposal and enforcement to the 
Commission and to require the Council to act by unanimity in certain 
policy areas but by qualified majority in other areas;117 the choice, when 
drafting European laws, to delegate rulemaking powers to the Commis-
sion alone or to the Commission acting together with a committee of 
national regulators; and the decision, if the Commission is required to 
act together with a committee of national regulators, to give the commit-
tee significant power, i.e., regulatory or management committees, or very 
little power, i.e., advisory committees.118 The political science literature 
has largely ignored the phenomenon of mixed procedure. But a similar 
choice is made when Member States decide to retain exclusive power 
over the application and enforcement of European law through indirect 
administration or to allow the Commission and other national regulators, 
sitting on comitology committees, to supervise their government offi-
cials through mixed procedure.  
In the political science literature on European integration a number 
of explanations have been advanced for delegations of power to suprana-
tional institutions like the Commission or intergovernmental bodies like 
the Council of Ministers and comitology committees. According to 
some, such institutions offer superior information on technical policy 
matters, above and beyond what can be generated by national admini-
strations.119 In a related argument, Mark Pollack has found evidence that 
powers are delegated to the Commission and other European institutions 
when speedy and efficient Europe-wide decisionmaking is needed.120 
Giandomenico Majone and Andrew Moravcsik have separately advanced 
the hypothesis that transfers of power to the Commission or intergov-
ernmental bodies are driven by the need for credible commitments.121 
                                                                                                                      
 116. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State 
Power from Messina to Maastricht 73 (1998); Mark A. Pollack, The Engines of 
European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU 19–74 
(2003). 
 117. See Moravcsik, supra note 116, at 67. 
 118. See Pollack, supra note 117, at 3, 114–130. 
 119. See Giandomenico Majone, The New European Agencies: Regulation by Informa-
tion, 4 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 262, 263 (1997). 
 120. See Pollack, supra note 117, at 107. 
 121. Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations 
in EU Governance, 2 Eur. Union Pol. 103 (2001); Moravcsik, supra note 116, at 73 (1998). 
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That is, in pursuing mutually beneficial policies such as free trade, 
Member States operate in a classic prisoner’s dilemma game in which, 
over time, they might be tempted to defect from the free trade line. To 
reassure the other parties to the strategic interaction that they will not 
defect, Member States commit themselves to the policy by giving pow-
ers of monitoring, sanctioning, and future decisionmaking to institutions 
with some degree of independence from national governments. 
The information privacy case can be explained by neither the exper-
tise nor the speed theories. Both would have predicted more extensive 
transfers of authority in the Data Protection Directive. Protecting privacy 
rights in the highly complex and rapidly changing field of information 
technology is extremely challenging; supranational mechanisms that af-
forded the prospect of expert and speedy solutions should have been 
attractive to the Member States. Such mechanisms, however, did not ma-
terialize in the Data Protection Directive. Rather, the Member States 
which negotiated the Directive were extremely reluctant to transfer poli-
cymaking authority to the European privacy network.  
The privacy network’s limited powers are consistent, instead, with 
the credible commitments theory. The Directive was highly contentious, 
with the result that even after five years of bargaining, the text ultimately 
adopted was so open-ended that it could accommodate most of the exist-
ing differences among the Member States.122 In other words, the Member 
States entered the negotiations on the Directive with vastly different 
preferences for information privacy.123 Because they had opposing views 
on the importance of privacy as a civil liberty, they were in no rush to 
credibly commit to a future stream of decisionmaking through networks. 
Moreover, to the extent that certain Member States had strong prefer-
ences for or against information privacy, they were unwilling to make 
concessions in other policy areas to induce opposing Member States to 
adopt their position in the Directive.124 Additionally, the policy on which 
the Member States were in agreement—the free movement of personal 
                                                                                                                      
See also Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics, 51 Int’l Org. 513 (1997) (Moravcsik articulating his theory of liberal institutional-
ism for international relations more generally). 
 122. See Simitis, Data Protection in the European Union, supra note 34, at 111–12; 
Simitis, From the Market to the Polis, supra note 15, at 457–58. 
 123. The European Parliament is absent from my account of the politics of the Directive 
because, at the time, it was not very influential. During the period when most of the drafting 
decisions were made, the Parliament only had powers of cooperation on harmonization meas-
ures, not powers of co-decision. See Craig & de Búrca, supra note 6, at 140–47 (describing 
difference between cooperation and co-decision). 
 124. On the use of linkages across policy areas to induce agreement and bargains in 
international negotiations, see, e.g., Christina L. Davis, International Institutions and Issue 
Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization, 98 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1 
(2004). 
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information throughout the European Union to facilitate commerce—
was not threatened by national differences in privacy regulation. In the 
entire history of the field, which stretches back to the first German and 
Swedish legislation in the early 1970s, information transfers from one 
jurisdiction to another jurisdiction had been blocked because of privacy 
concerns in only a handful of cases.125  
The bargaining history of the Directive contains significant evidence 
for this hypothesis.126 First, the record shows that the Member States ac-
tively opposed the Commission’s attempt to shift policymaking authority 
to European institutions, namely the Commission and a comitology 
committee. Although the Commission originally proposed an extensive 
role for European institutions, the Member States subsequently reduced 
that role to a minimum. 
The first version of the Directive, published by the Commission in 
1990, gave the Commission rulemaking authority in all areas covered by 
the Directive.127 Furthermore, an advisory committee would have moni-
tored the Commission, meaning that the Member States would have had 
relatively little influence over the Commission.128 Therefore, had the ini-
tial proposal gone through, the Commission would have been able to 
harmonize everything from notification and authorization processes to 
the specific requirements for obtaining consumer consent and securing 
personal data, with only a marginal role for the Member States.  
                                                                                                                      
 125. See infra text accompanying note 154. 
 126. Negotiations on the Directive began with the publication of the Commission’s pro-
posal on September 13, 1990, Communication on the Protection of Individuals, supra note 36, 
COM(90)314 final-SYN 287 (basic directive proposal) and 288 (sector-specific telecommuni-
cations privacy proposal), and ended with the publication of the Directive on October 24, 
1995. I obtained access to the Council records by filing an access to documents request. The 
record includes minutes from at least twenty-five meetings of national civil servants (Working 
Party on Economic Questions (Data Protection)), four meetings of high-ranking diplomats 
from Member State permanent representations to the European Union (COREPER), and two 
meetings of national ministers (Council of Ministers). The record also includes numerous 
working documents circulated between the meetings. 
 127. Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection of individuals in relation 
to the processing of personal data, art. 29, 1990 O.J. (C 277) 3 (“The Commission shall . . . 
adopt such technical measures as are necessary to apply this Directive to the specific charac-
teristics of certain sectors having regard to the state of the art in this field and to the codes of 
conduct.”).  
 128. Id. at art. 30. There are three types of committees of national representatives created 
to supervise the Commission when it implements European laws: advisory, management, and 
regulatory committees. The main difference is the degree of control they have over Commis-
sion decisionmaking. With an advisory committee, the Commission must simply “take into 
account” the committee’s opinion. A management committee has a veto power over Commis-
sion decisions, meaning that it may vote against a Commission decision, while a regulatory 
committee has the power of assent, meaning that it must vote in favor of a Commission deci-
sion. Bignami, supra note 11, at 8–13 (describing different types of comitology committees). 
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Over the course of the Council deliberations, however, the Member 
States all but eliminated the Commission’s powers. In the Council, the 
Member State representatives who worked on the Directive for almost 
five years disagreed on many things, but the Commission’s powers was 
not one of them. From the very beginning, they were unanimous on the 
need for a stronger comitology committee of Member State representa-
tives to discipline the Commission.129 Ultimately, a compromise was 
reached with the European Parliament, generally more supportive of the 
Commission position, in which a management committee with the power 
to veto the Commission’s implementing measures was instituted.130 Fur-
thermore, toward the very end of the negotiations in the Council, at the 
point when the Directive was escalated from the technical working party 
to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the Com-
mission’s executive powers were eliminated at France’s insistence.131 All 
that was left was the power to regulate international data transfers 
through the mixed procedure analyzed in this Article.  
The Member States also watered down the powers of the European 
privacy network in the area of international data transfers. As explained 
previously, the procedure established under the Directive allows national 
regulators to authorize transfers to third countries and then gives the 
Commission and Member States the opportunity to object. The initial 
versions of the Directive afforded greater protection for the right to ob-
ject, giving European actors—the Commission and other Member States 
                                                                                                                      
 129. See Council Doc. 8268/91, Results of Deliberations (Travaux) of Working Party on 
“Economic Questions” (Data Protection) (Sept. 19, 1991). At this meeting, a large number of 
Member States advocated a regulatory committee. By late 1994, all of the Member States, 
with the exception of Belgium, were in favor of the strongest form of regulatory committee 
(type IIIB), with Belgium advocating the slightly weaker form (type IIIA). See Council Doc. 
10957/94, Summary Minutes from the 1628th Meeting of the Committee of Permanent Repre-
sentatives in Brussels (Nov. 14, 1994). At the time, the only difference between the two types 
of regulatory committee was that, if a IIIB committee did not give its assent and the Commis-
sion’s proposed measure was sent to the Council, the Council could simply veto the measure 
rather than having to agree on an alternative to the Commission’s measure. 
 130. Data Protection Directive, supra note 5, at art. 31. The UK wanted to reject the 
European Parliament’s amendment establishing a management committee, which would have 
required further negotiations with the Parliament on a so-called “conciliation committee.” 
However, the UK was out-numbered by the other delegations. Council Doc. 9016/95 EXT 
2(f), Summary Minutes of the 1662th meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representa-
tives, First Part, Brussels (July 13, 1995). 
 131. Council Doc. 11369/94, Report of the Committee of Permanent Representatives of 
November 24, 1994 to the Internal Market Council of Ministers of December 8, 1994. In this 
report, COREPER pointed out that the Commission under the existing version had extensive 
powers of execution and that, in France’s view, such powers should be eliminated. In the 
Council’s version of the Directive, officially adopted on February 24, 1995, the Commission’s 
general rulemaking authority had vanished. See Communication of the Commission to the 
European Parliament concerning the Council’s common position, SEC (95) 303 final-COD 
287 (Feb. 24, 1995). 
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on the comitology committee—a greater role in the national decision on 
transfers of personal information abroad. In the Commission’s first pro-
posal, a national decision to allow a transfer to an inadequate third 
country could only take effect ten days after notification to the Commis-
sion, to allow time for either the Commission or other Member States to 
object before the transfer occurred.132 In the Commission’s second pro-
posal, the ten-day guarantee was replaced by a vaguer Member State 
duty to notify the Commission and other Member States in “good time 
of its proposal to grant authorization.”133 By the time the Council had 
finished deliberating, the waiting period had disappeared altogether. Un-
der the Directive, Member States must simply notify the Commission 
after the authorization has been granted.134 The record of the Council 
negotiations shows that this last modification was made after the UK, 
Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden objected that the third country procedure 
was too “heavy” and “bureaucratic.”135 
Second, the record demonstrates extreme disagreement among na-
tional representatives on privacy, lending support to the hypothesis that 
the Member States’ opposition to sharing power in an administrative 
network was driven by disagreement over the substance of information 
privacy policy.136 On one extreme was the UK, supported to various de-
grees by Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden. This northern bloc did not see the need for a Data Protection 
Directive and would have preferred to rely simply on the Council of 
Europe Convention.137 The northern bloc, joined sometimes by other 
                                                                                                                      
 132. Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection of individuals in relation 
to the processing of personal data, art. 25.1, 1990 O.J. C 277 (3). 
 133. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 27.2, 
1992 O.J. (C 311) 30. 
 134. Data Protection Directive, supra note 5, at art. 26.3. 
 135. Council Doc. 7500/94, COREPER Report to the Internal Market Council 10 (June 
9, 1994); Council Doc. 9951/94, Working Document of Secretary General of the Council to 
the attention of the delegations, 43–44 (Oct. 12, 1994); Council Doc. 9957/94, supra note 101; 
Council Doc. 10957/94, supra note 129. 
 136. See the remarks of Irish delegation on lack of a common “legal philosophy” in 
Résultats des travaux du Groupe des “Questions économiques” (Protection des données) en 
date du 25 février 1991 [Results of the Working Party on Economic Questions (Data Protec-
tion) dating from Feb. 25, 1991], Doc. No. 5207/91, Restreint ECO 32, at 6 (Mar. 14, 1991) 
(on file with author). 
 137. As late as October 1993, three years after the first Commission proposal was intro-
duced, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK continued to object to a Data 
Protection Directive and preferred the less detailed Council of Europe Convention. See Extrait 
du Projet de Compte Rendu Sommaire de la 1582ème réunion du Comité des Représentants 
Permanents (1ère partie) tenue à Bruxelles le jeudi 14 octobre 1993, Point 11 de l’ordre du 
jour [Excerpt from the Summary Draft Minutes of the 1582nd Meeting of the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (Part I) Held in Brussels on Thursday, Oct. 14, 1993, Point 11 in 
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Member States, opposed a number of vital aspects of the Directive: the 
inclusion of manual data in the definition of personal data,138 notification 
of data processing operations,139 authorization for sensitive personal in-
formation,140 the broad definition of sensitive personal information,141 the 
procedure for third country transfers,142 the type of information to be 
provided to citizens on how their personal information was being used,143 
and the prohibition on decisions based exclusively on automatic data 
processing.144 Throughout, the northern bloc criticized the Directive as 
bureaucratic, burdensome, and impractical.145 In the end, in fact, the UK 
abstained from the final vote in the Council to express its opposition to 
                                                                                                                      
the Order of the Day], Doc. No. 9186/93, Ext 1, Restreint, CRS/CRP 34 ECO 248, (Oct. 21, 
1993) (on file with author). 
 138. See, e.g., Résultats des travaux du Group “Questions économiques” (Protection des 
données) en dates des 5/6 octobre 1992 [Results of the Working Party on Economic Questions 
(Data Protection) dating from Oct. 5–6, 1992], Doc. No. 9388/92, Restreint ECO 220, at 6 
n.16 (Oct. 20, 1992) (Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and the UK objecting to the inclusion of man-
ual data in the definition of personal data) (on file with author). 
 139. See, e.g., Résultats des travaux du Groupe des “Questions économiques” (Protec-
tion des données) en date du 20 et 21 fevrier 1992 [Results of the Working Party on Economic 
Questions (Data Protection) dating from Feb. 20–21, 1992], Doc. No. 4981/92, Restreint ECO 
33, at 3–5 (May 9, 1992) (UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark objecting to notifica-
tion) (on file with author). 
 140. See, e.g., Résultats des travaux du Groupe des “Questions économiques” (Protec-
tion des données) en date du 19 March 1992 [Results of the Working Party on Economic 
Questions (Data Protection) dating from Mar. 19, 1992], Doc. No. 5490/92 ECO 50 (Apr. 7, 
1992) (on file with author) (Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and Ireland objecting to au-
thorization). 
 141. See, e.g., Résultats des travaux du Groupe des “Questions économiques” (Protec-
tion des données) en date du 29 octobre 1992 [Results of the Working Party on Economic 
Questions (Data Protection) dating from Oct. 29, 1992], Doc. No. 9918/92 Restreint ECO 
246, at 2 (Nov. 11, 1992) (on file with author) (the UK objecting to definition of sensitive 
data); Note from the President dated 10 May 1994 to Permanent Representatives Committee, 
Doc. No. 6856/94, Restreint ECO 1030, at 10 (May 18, 1994) (on file with author) (Germany, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Portugal, and Greece opposing an exhaustive list 
of sensitive data because of different national laws). 
 142. See Council Doc. 7500/94, supra note 135 (UK, Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden 
objecting). 
 143. See Note from the President dated May 10, 1994 to Permanent Representatives 
Committee, Doc. No. 6856/94, Restreint ECO 1030, at 15 (May 18, 1994) (on file with au-
thor) (Germany, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK objecting to the list of 
information to be given to the data subject). 
 144. See, e.g., Résultats des Travaux du Groupe des questions économiques (Protection 
des données) en date du 29 et 30 mai 1994 [Results of the Working Party on Economic Ques-
tions (Data Protection) dating from May 29–30, 1994], Doc. No. 7993/94, at 5 (June 23, 1994) 
(on file with author) (Denmark, Ireland, and the UK objecting to inclusion of article on auto-
matic data processing). 
 145. See, e.g., Council Doc. 9957/94, supra note 101. (Denmark, Ireland, the UK, sup-
ported by Finland, Norway, and Sweden objecting to notification because it was too 
“bureaucratic”). 
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the Directive.146 On the other side of all these issues was a bloc consist-
ing of France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, and Luxembourg. The result was 
that the final version of the Directive included principles such as authori-
zation but such principles allowed for so many exceptions that Member 
States could sidestep them entirely in their implementation of the Direc-
tive. 
One puzzle of this history is that notwithstanding the radical differ-
ences separating the Member States, at no point did either camp use the 
possibility of bargaining and linkages with other policy domains to pre-
vail. On neither side were preferences strong enough to push through 
one vision of privacy rights or the other. One explanation might be that 
privacy rights often come into conflict with government surveillance and 
other public initiatives. Therefore, even governments with extensive pri-
vacy regimes at home might not have had a strong interest once in 
Brussels in creating a tough Europe-wide privacy scheme. 
A third type of evidence in the bargaining history supports the credi-
ble commitment hypothesis. From the Council record, it appears that the 
common interest that was shared by the Member States—free trade—did 
not require extensive harmonization of national privacy laws through the 
Directive. The national representatives in the Council did not express 
significant concern that the free circulation of personal information, vital 
to commerce in the common market, would be hindered by disparate 
regulatory regimes. A word of explanation is necessary because this 
claim goes contrary to the common wisdom regarding the Directive.147 
The Directive was passed as a common market measure, meaning that it 
was based on the powers of the European Community under Article 95 
(ex-Article 100A) of the EC Treaty to harmonize national legislation that 
impedes the functioning of the common market.148 The case for a Direc-
tive, however, rested heavily on the failure of a number of Member 
States to ratify the Council of Europe Convention, which contains a se-
ries of very general standards for the storage, use, and transfer of 
electronic personal information.149 In 1981, immediately after the Con-
vention had been signed, the Commission called upon the Member 
States to ratify it, adding that “if all the Member States do not within a 
reasonable time sign and ratify the Convention, the Commission reserves 
                                                                                                                      
 146. Draft Minutes of the 1827th meeting of the Council (General Affairs) held in Brus-
sels on Monday, 6 February 1995, Doc. No. 4734/1/95 REV1 Limite PV/CONS 4, at 9 (Jan, 
19, 1996) (on file with author). 
 147. See, e.g., Patrick J. Murray, The Adequacy Standard Under Directive 95/46/EC: 
Does US Data Protection Meet This Standard?, 21 Fordham Int’l L.J. 932, 935–38 (1998). 
 148. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 5, at preamble. The Directive was passed 
before the EC Treaty was renumbered by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and therefore at the 
time its legal basis was article 100A. 
 149. See Communication on the Protection of Individuals, supra note 36, at 15. 
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the right to propose that the Council adopt an instrument on the basis of 
the EEC Treaty.”150 Nearly ten years later, two of the original Member 
States—Italy and Belgium—still did not have privacy legislation, and the 
three Member States that had since joined—Greece, Spain, and Portu-
gal—had not adopted privacy legislation.151 It appears, therefore, that 
when the Commission and the Member States began negotiations they 
agreed on the need to put into place some form of domestic privacy leg-
islation, but not on the need for a single, harmonized set of national 
laws. 
Another piece of the historical record that suggests that free trade 
was not the primary concern underlying the harmonization provisions in 
the Directive was the dispute over legal basis. Member States were di-
vided over whether ex-Article 100A was the appropriate legal basis for 
the Directive or whether, as a human rights measure, the Directive fell 
under the general purpose provision of the EC Treaty, ex-Article 235.152 
(Ex-Article 235, now Article 308, is similar in purpose and effect to the 
U.S. Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause.) This dispute suggests 
that a number of Member States did not believe that the primary intent or 
effect of the Directive was to facilitate trade.153 Finally, even though in-
formation privacy was not a new policy area and national laws had 
existed for two decades, in remarkably few instances had national au-
thorities taken action to stop transfers to other European countries.154 
                                                                                                                      
 150. Id. at 14. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Doc. No. 5207/91, Restreint ECO 32, supra note 136 (Ireland, Belgium and the UK 
objecting to legal basis); Letter from Permanent Representative of Belgium to the CE, to N. 
Ersboll, the Secretary General of the Council of CE (Feb. or Mar. 2001) (questioning whether 
the Community has competence to legislate in this area given that it is a matter of human 
rights covered in Art. 8, ECHR and Convention 108, and requesting an opinion from Legal 
Services of the Council); Doc No. 9388/92, Restreint ECO 220, supra note 138 (Germany and 
Belgium objecting to legal basis of Directive); Résultats des travaux du Groupe des “Ques-
tions économiques” (Protection des données) en date du 19 et 20 juin 1991 [Results of the 
Working Party on Economic Questions (Data Protection) dating from June 19–20, 1991] Doc. 
No.7284/91, Restreint ECO 93 (July 19,1991) (on file with author) (delivering opinion of 
Council’s Legal Service on the appropriate legal basis for the Directive). 
 153. Of course, disputes over the legal basis for European measures are often thinly 
veiled disputes over the desirability of the measure. Measures adopted under ex-Article 100A 
can be adopted by qualified majority, whereas measures adopted under ex-Article 235 require 
unanimity. Nevertheless, it is significant that the legal basis argument was made on the record: 
national representatives could credibly claim that the Directive was primarily about human 
rights and not trade.  
 154. A literature search turns up three episodes. First, France had blocked a data transfer 
to Italy. Fiat-France wished to transfer employee information to Fiat headquarters in Italy but 
the transfer was blocked by the French privacy authority (CNIL). According to CNIL, the 
personal information of Fiat’s French employees would not be protected adequately once 
transferred to Italy because, at the time, Italy did not have a data protection law. Only after 
Fiat-France and Fiat-Italy had signed a contract in which Fiat-Italy undertook to respect the 
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Indeed the three salient episodes in the literature all involved transfers to 
countries without any information privacy legislation, not countries with 
inadequate legislation.155 
The last category of evidence in the Council record for the credible 
commitment explanation is the link between opposition to European in-
stitutions and a strong national position on information privacy. The 
minutes from the Council indicate that France was the main proponent 
of eliminating the Commission’s implementing powers.156 France is a 
country with a long-standing tradition of privacy as a basic liberty and 
with an extensive government regulatory scheme. Although hardly dis-
positive, France’s opposition is consistent with the credible commitment 
hypothesis. One plausible reason for why France opposed conferring 
powers to a European privacy network was that the French regulation of 
privacy was at odds with the approach elsewhere. 
The other Member State with a strong view on privacy—on the op-
posite end of the policy spectrum from France—was also a vocal 
opponent of transferring administrative authority to European institu-
tions. At the eleventh hour, the UK requested further negotiations with 
the European Parliament because it believed that the comitology com-
mittee’s powers over the Commission were not substantial enough. In 
response to a parliamentary amendment, the Commission had reduced 
the powers of the comitology committee in the final version of the Di-
rective.157 However, the other Member States did not wish to 
compromise their legislative deal over the comitology issue and they 
approved the Directive as it stood. The UK’s resistance on the institu-
tional issue is significant. UK preferences on the substance of privacy 
policy were diametrically opposed to those of France, but its preferences 
on procedure were similar. Unlike France, the UK was skeptical of in-
formation privacy and believed that other values, such as freedom of the 
press and effective administration, were more important. Like France, 
the UK opposed transferring powers to an institutional process that could 
                                                                                                                      
French law on privacy, did CNIL permit the transfer. See Paul M. Schwartz, European Data 
Protection Law and Restrictions on International Data Flows, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 471, 491–92 
(1995). The other two episodes involve transfers of data from Sweden to the UK. In the first, 
the Swedish Data Inspection Board refused to grant a license to public authorities seeking to 
transfer health data on the Swedish population to the UK for the manufacture of plastic health 
cards. In the second case, the Data Inspection Board denied a license to an exporter seeking to 
transfer the information to the UK for the production of a catalogue. See Jon Bing, Transna-
tional Data Flows and the Scandinavian Data Protection Legislation, 24 Scandinavian 
Stud. L. 65 (1980). 
 155. See Schwartz supra note 154; Bing, supra note 154. 
 156. Council Doc. 11369/94, supra note 131. 
 157. See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text. 
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be taken over by supranational and national regulators with very differ-
ent policy commitments.  
In summary, Member States resisted giving the European privacy 
network extensive powers because of their disagreement on the sub-
stance of information privacy policy. As a result, primary responsibility 
for interpreting and enforcing the Data Protection Directive rests with 
national administrations, not European institutions. Member States sim-
ply did not trust the Commission, acting with other Member States, to 
protect privacy rights and to strike the correct balance between civil lib-
erties and the information needs of government and the market.  
Even though European networks generate regulatory convergence, 
their very formation presupposes a certain degree of consensus among 
governments. Therefore, to explain the emergence of this form of Euro-
pean governance, it is not enough to analyze what might be 
accomplished through the creation of networks. Rather, it is necessary to 
examine the broader economic, social, and political dynamics that lead 
to common national preferences in the first place or that enable some 
government officials to induce other officials, through bargaining, to 
adopt their preferences.  
B. Implications for Transgovernmental Networks  
Inferences may be drawn for transgovernmental networks in other 
regional organizations and the international realm. The experience of the 
European privacy network suggests that the rise of transnational net-
works is as much an indicator of convergence as it is a generator of 
convergence. In other words, even though we might observe that transna-
tional networks cause information exchange and regulatory convergence, 
the mere desire for such exchange and convergence does not cause the 
networks. This form of governance rests upon a deeper consensus among 
the participating officials on the desirability of certain public policies; 
alternatively, networks are created when certain participating govern-
ments can gain advantages from adopting the regulatory approach of 
other governments, advantages such as attracting investor capital.  
It is important to take care in generalizing from European to transna-
tional networks. The credible commitment and loss of national control 
associated with transnational networks, even those created by interna-
tional agreement, is not nearly as significant as that which characterizes 
European networks.158 The reason for this difference is the power of the 
European Commission, backed up by the European Courts and the 
European judicial system. In European networks, national governments 
                                                                                                                      
 158. Slaughter, supra note 9, at 153–54. 
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retain extensive powers, but when disputes arise among them or among 
Commission officials and national regulators, the Commission has the 
legal authority to step in. Nevertheless, to participate in a transnational 
network is to cede some degree of control over domestic policymaking. 
Regulators give other national regulators the power to examine and criti-
cize their domestic laws and administrative practices. This transfer of 
power carries potentially significant costs in the form of loss of reputa-
tion in global markets and in dealings with other States in the 
international realm. Before they tie their hands through networks, gov-
ernment officials must reach some agreement on the policies to be 
pursued by the networks.  
IV. Evaluating Networks  
How does network governance fare when matched against principles 
of liberal democracy? To what extent are the individual rights and de-
mocratic accountability guaranteed by the administrative law of liberal 
democracy protected when regulators share their powers with other na-
tional regulators? This section assesses the European privacy network 
from the perspective of Italian liberal democracy. The question of 
whether the mixed procedure for international data transfers respects 
these basic values is divided into two parts.159 First, I examine the se-
quence of decisions anticipated in the text of the Directive and I 
determine whether this sequences affords individuals the traditional 
guarantees of Italian administrative law. Second, I repeat the normative 
exercise for the actual administrative practice of international data trans-
fers, which departs significantly from the text of the Directive. The 
section concludes by suggesting some implications for networks in the 
global realm.  
A. The Law of the European Privacy Network: 
The Italian Case  
The Data Protection Directive and the Italian implementing legisla-
tion envision a complex sequence of decisions by national and 
supranational regulators before personal information may be transferred 
outside the European Union. The interaction of the two legal frameworks 
is set forth below, organized under each of the Directive’s two provisions 
on third country transfers, Articles 25 and 26. In both cases, the deci-
sionmaking occurs in three stages, the first and last being made at the 
                                                                                                                      
 159. For purposes of this section, democratic accountability is defined as the link be-
tween bureaucrats and elected officials, voters, and the general public. 
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domestic level, the middle stage at the European level. The statutory 
provisions that authorize regulators to act at each stage are provided in 
the citations. 
Initial Domestic 
Administrative Action 
European Review Domestic Implementation 
of EU Decision 
Article 25 (Transfer to adequate third countries) 
An administrative decision to 
block a particular data transfer 
or enjoin future data transfers 
based on a finding that the 
third country is inadequate. 
Technically, this would be 
issued as an order 
(provvedimento) of the 
Garante.160 
Commission negotiations 
with the third country found 
“inadequate” by the 
Garante leads to a change 
in the country’s privacy 
regime and the 
Commission acting in 
conjunction with the 
working party and 
comitology committee 
issues a decision finding 
that the country is 
“adequate.”161 
The Garante gives effect to the 
Commission decision with a 
general authorization 
(autorizzazione generale) 
allowing transfers to the third 
country to which transfers 
previously prohibited.162 
Initial Domestic 
Administrative Action 
European Review Domestic Implementation 
of EU Decision 
Article 26 (Exceptions to adequacy principle) 
An administrative decision to 
authorize a data transfer 
based on a finding that the 
particulars of the transaction 
will guarantee privacy, 
regardless of the adequacy of 
the third country’s privacy 
laws. This would be issued by 
the Garante as an individual 
authorization 
(autorizzazione).163  
 
An administrative rule 
authorizing certain types of 
transfers, regardless of the 
adequacy of the third 
country’s privacy laws. This 
would issued by the Garante 
as a general authorization 
(autorizzazione generale).164  
 
Commission, acting in 
conjunction with the 
comitology committee, 
issues a decision finding 
that the safeguards 
deemed by the Garante to 
guarantee privacy are not 
protective enough.165 
The Garante gives effect to the 
Commission decision by 
revoking the specific 
authorization (autorizzazione) 
permitting a third country 
transfer or the general 
authorization (autorizzazione 
generale) permitting a class of 
transfers.166 
                                                                                                                      
 160. Decreto Legislativo 30 giugno 2003 n. 196, Codice in materia di protezione dei dati 
personali [Decree-Law No. 196 of June 30, 2003, Personal Data Protection Code], art. 154, 
Gazz. Uff., no. 174 (July 29, 2003) (Italy). 
 161. Data Protection Directive, supra note 5, at art. 25.6. 
 162. Decree-Law No. 196 of June 30, 2003, Personal Data Protection Code, at art. 44. 
 163. Id. at art. 44. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Data Protection Directive, supra note 5, at art. 26.3. 
 166. Personal Data Protection Code, at art. 44. 
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Italian and European administrative law principles, applied by Italian 
and European administrative bodies and courts to this procedure, appear 
to guarantee individual rights fairly effectively. For present purposes, 
individual rights are defined as the opportunity to participate in adminis-
trative determinations and the ability to challenge such determinations in 
an independent judicial forum. Generally speaking, a strong right to par-
ticipate in administrative decisionmaking does not exist in droit 
administratif systems.167 Rather, individual rights are protected through 
the availability of review in an independent forum, which in countries 
like France and Italy is a separate branch of government administration 
and is not part of the ordinary judicial system.168 In Italy, however, deci-
sionmaking by government administration has become increasingly 
proceduralized over the past decade. A law passed in 1990 guarantees, in 
addition to review in an independent forum, the right of participation in 
administrative adjudications: affected individuals have a right to examine 
the administrative record, submit written arguments and evidence, and 
receive a decision in writing which gives reasons and shows that their 
position was considered.169  
The Garante adheres to the requirements of the 1990 law.170 There-
fore, a firm that opposed a proposed order blocking an international data 
transfer (first type of administrative action) or an individual who op-
posed a proposed order allowing such a transfer (second type of 
administrative action) would have the opportunity to persuade the Ga-
rante otherwise in an administrative proceeding. Even in rulemaking, 
which in Italian and continental law more generally is considered a mat-
ter of discretionary policymaking and does not give rise to legal rights of 
individual participation, the Garante has a reputation for consulting the 
community of interested parties. Therefore, a firm or individual with 
opinions on a rule permitting a certain class of transfers (third type of 
administrative action) would probably be heard, albeit in a very loose 
sense of the word.  
If the Garante’s determination triggers review by the Commission 
and a comitology committee—the European phase of the administrative 
proceeding—individual participation would be guaranteed only if the 
European determination turned on the particular facts of an individual 
                                                                                                                      
 167. On the traditional approach, see Giacinto della Cananea, Beyond the State: The 
Europeanization and Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, 9 Eur. Pub. L. 563, 
566 (2003). 
 168. See L. Neville Brown & John S. Bell, French Administrative Law 213–50 
(5th ed. 1998); Manuale di Diritto Pubblico 434–46 (Sabino Cassese et al. eds., 2001). 
 169. Legge 7 agosto 1990 n. 241 [Law No. 241 of Aug. 7, 1990], Gazz. Uff. no. 192 
(Aug. 18, 1990) (Italy). See Sandulli, supra note 94, at 1035, 1057–59. 
 170. See Regolamento 28 giugno 2000 n. 1 [Regulation No. 1 of June 28, 2000], Gazz. 
Uff. no. 162 (July 13, 2000) (Italy). 
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data transfer.171 This would occur most likely if the Garante had approved 
a foreign transfer based on a contract submitted by an individual firm 
(second type of administrative action). Otherwise, neither the Data Pro-
tection Directive nor the general background law governing comitology 
require that individuals be allowed to make submissions or argue their 
case before the Commission and the committee.172 Thus, if an Italian de-
termination involving a general assessment of a third country’s adequacy 
(first type of administrative action) or a model contract (third type of 
administrative action) were then submitted to Europe-wide review, indi-
viduals would not have a right to participate. In the abstract, this might 
be objectionable. But if the benchmark is the state of affairs at the na-
tional level in the absence of mixed procedure, the lack of participation 
is not cause for concern. As discussed earlier, a strong right of participa-
tion in administrative proceedings does not exist in Italy, especially in 
what is considered discretionary policymaking. Discretionary policy-
making is the vast majority of what European institutions do in the 
international privacy arena.  
Neither does the particular sequence of administration decisions an-
ticipated in the Data Protection Directive appear to compromise access 
to judicial review. Although Italy does not yet have actual experience 
with challenges to administrative determinations under these provisions, 
it is clear that judicial review would be available under standard princi-
ples of Italian administrative law.173 Assume for the moment that the 
Garante’s decision does not trigger a comitology proceeding. If the deci-
sion were of the first or second type, judicial review would be easy to 
obtain. The Italian concept of “legitimate interest” (interesse legittimo), 
which serves as a functional equivalent of standing in U.S. law would 
include the financial interest of a data-exporting firm in challenging a 
                                                                                                                      
 171. See Case C-269/90, Hauptzollamt München-Mitte v. Technische Universität 
München, 1991 E.C.R. I-5469. 
 172. See Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 Laying Down the Procedures 
for the Exercise of Implementing Powers Conferred on the Commission, 1999 O.J. (L 184) 23 
[hereinafter Comitology Decision]. 
 173. The Italian data protection legislation modifies background Italian administrative 
law by specifying that all challenges to the Garante’s decisions, regardless of whether they 
involve “subjective rights” or “legitimate interests” are to be brought in the civil courts. 
Decreto Legislativo 30 giugno 2003 n. 196, Codice in materia di protezione dei dati personali 
[Decree-Law No. 196 of June 30, 2003, Personal Data Protection Code], art. 152, Gazz. Uff., 
no. 174 (July 29, 2003) (Italy). Both “legitimate interests” and “subjective rights” serve as the 
functional equivalent of standing in U.S. law. The difference is that a “legitimate interest” 
must be vindicated in a specialized administrative court, while a “subjective right” must be 
vindicated in an ordinary civil court. The Italian data protection law therefore improves the 
availability of judicial review by avoiding the time-consuming process of deciding in which 
court—civil or administrative—to bring a suit. Furthermore, the civil courts are generally 
believed to be less deferential to the government than administrative courts and hence individ-
ual rights should be better protected under this scheme. 
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prohibition on an international transfer.174 Likewise, an individual seek-
ing to challenge an authorization allowing the transfer of her personal 
information would be found, in all likelihood, to have the “subjective 
right” (diritto soggettivo) necessary to do so. Under Italian administra-
tive law, such a right exists because privacy rights are considered 
fundamental and the breach of privacy rights can lead to material injury 
and emotional distress.175 
If the decision were a rule allowing a class of information transfers, 
it would be more difficult to obtain judicial review (third type of admin-
istrative action). In Italian law, individuals generally are not believed to 
have interests that can be adversely affected by administrative rulemak-
ing and vindicated through judicial review.176 Potential challengers would 
have to wait until the rule was applied to a specific case, for example if 
the Garante denied, based on a general authorization, an individual peti-
tion seeking to block an international transfer. 
Now assume that the Garante’s decision triggers a European pro-
ceeding which results in an opposite determination. That is, the Italian 
authorities prohibit data transfers to a third country but, after negotia-
tions by the Commission, that third country is found to be adequate. The 
Garante, therefore, must issue a general authorization implementing the 
European decision and permitting such transfers (first type of adminis-
trative action). Or the Garante authorizes transfers to “inadequate” third 
countries, which on review by the Commission and comitology commit-
tee are found to lack adequate privacy safeguards. The Garante, 
                                                                                                                      
 174. In the early history of Italian administrative law, only “subjective rights,” rights 
guaranteed under the Civil Code, were protected against state action. Individuals could bring 
suits against government in ordinary civil courts and obtain damages for claims which, to 
translate into the common law, sounded in property, contract, or tort. In 1889, the Council of 
State (Consiglio di Stato) was given the power to review government acts for lawfulness. To-
day, individuals can bring challenges to administrative acts, even if they have not suffered an 
injury to their person or property that is recognized under the Civil Code. The remedy is not 
damages but an order annulling the administrative act. Nonetheless, an individual seeking to 
challenge such an act still needs a “legitimate interest” in the procedural and substantive regu-
larity of the act. The example often used to illustrate the concept is a civil service exam which 
was not administered according to the letter of the law. The applicants do not have a subjective 
right in being employed by the state, but they do have a legitimate interest in ensuring that the 
exam was administered fairly. See Marcello Clarich, La Giustizia, in 2 Trattato di Diritto 
Amministrativo, supra note 94, at 2021, 2055–58, 2069–73. 
 175. See Giorgio Resta, Il diritto alla protezione dei dati personali, in Il codice dei 
dati personali: Temi e problemi supra, note 89 (stating that data protection is considered a 
fundamental rights and thus receives all the judicial guarantees generally afforded to 
fundamental rights); Salvatore Sica, Le tutele civili, in Il codice dei dati personali: Temi e 
problemi, supra, note 89 (describing tort liability for infringement of privacy rights).  
 176. Jacques Ziller, Le contrôle du pouvoir réglementaire en Europe, 9 L’Actualité 
Juridique Droit Administratif 635, 642 (1999). 
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therefore, is required to revoke the individual or general authorization 
(second and third type of administrative action).  
In the second type of proceeding, in which an initial Italian determi-
nation favorable to a particular individual is reversed by the 
Commission, either the Commission’s decision would be amenable to 
review in the Court of Justice or the Garante’s implementing decision 
could be challenged in the Italian courts. One case involving such a pro-
ceeding, in which the distribution of agricultural subsidies was at issue, 
demonstrated some confusion as to which court—an Italian court or the 
European Court of Justice—was responsible for hearing the challenge to 
the decision. The Italian court held that the challenge should be brought 
in the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice ruled that the matter was for 
Italian courts and possibly the Court of Justice through a preliminary 
reference from an Italian court. Thus the Court of Justice directed the 
plaintiffs to bring their action below.177 A growing body of Court of Jus-
tice case law, however, is setting down the criteria for dividing 
jurisdiction over such administrative proceedings.178 Any shortcomings, 
therefore, in access to judicial review can be put down to the growing 
pains of a new European polity rather than the particularities of network 
governance. 
Otherwise, in the first and third types of proceedings, the Commis-
sion’s reversal would not be amenable to review immediately but at a 
later stage, when applied by the Garante to permit or prohibit a specific 
third country transfer. That is because the Commission’s decision to 
permit transfers to an “adequate” third country or to stop certain types of 
transfers whose terms fail to protect privacy are general determinations. 
Neither European nor Italian law permits such general rules to be chal-
lenged in the abstract; an individual would have to wait until the rule was 
applied to her case.179 Later on, an individual who disputed the Commis-
sion’s finding and considered that her personal information was being 
transferred to an inadequate third country could object in Italian court 
(first type of proceeding). Likewise, a corporation that sought to transfer 
personal information abroad using a standard-form contract that had 
                                                                                                                      
 177. Case C-97/91, Oleificio Borelli SpA v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. I-6313. See della 
Cananea, supra note 53 (manuscript at 201, on file with author) (discussing the Borelli case). 
 178. This is the Court’s case law on whether a decision is of “direct” concern to an indi-
vidual and therefore is reviewable in the Court of Justice. See Craig & de Búrca, supra note 
6, at 518. 
 179. See Craig & de Búrca, supra note 6, at 486–503 (stating that parties must be 
“individually concerned” by European acts to have standing before the European Court of 
Justice); Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella, L’Attività, in 1 Trattato di Diritto Amministrativo: 
Diritto Amministrativo Generale 699, 753 (Sabino Cassese ed., 2003) (stating that, under 
Italian law, broadly applicable administrative acts such as general authorizations and rules can 
only be challenged when applied in concrete cases).  
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been vetoed by the Commission could go to Italian court to challenge the 
Commission’s veto (third type of proceeding).180 
On balance, it does not appear that this novel administrative struc-
ture, based on a sequence of decisions made by different national and 
supranational officials, prevents individuals from seeking review of ad-
ministrative decisions in the courts. Although to a French or American 
jurist the Italian law on access to judicial review might appear quite re-
strictive, the fact remains that administrative decisions may be 
challenged regardless of whether European regulators intervene or the 
Garante acts alone.181 Likewise, the intensity of judicial review, that is 
how carefully administrative decisions are scrutinized on substantive 
grounds such as lawfulness and reasonableness does not appear to suffer. 
Italian courts and the European Court of Justice employ similar grounds 
of judicial review and give similar deference to administration. There-
fore, the partial transfer of judicial review powers to the Court of Justice, 
implicit in the preliminary reference procedure, does not lower standards 
of judicial review.182 
The European privacy network also satisfies the conventional admin-
istrative law principle of transparency. Transparency signifies the right to 
know which bureaucrats decide what—part of the basic rule of law guar-
antee that citizens are to be governed by laws and the principled 
application of laws, not men. Transparency also means the right to learn 
of the considerations and documents that inform final administrative de-
cisions. 
Mixed procedure in the Data Protection Directive and myriad other 
European laws represents a codification of regulatory networks; such 
networks have always assisted in the implementation of European law 
but, in the past, they often existed on an informal basis. Two elements of 
the network are codified: the vertical relationship between national regu-
lators and other national regulators and the Commission and the 
horizontal relationship between national regulators sitting on European 
                                                                                                                      
 180. See generally Trevor C. Hartley, European Union Law in a Global Con-
text: Text, Cases, and Materials 361–62 (2004) (discussing circumstances under which 
measures are not of “direct concern” and thus must be challenged in national court, not the 
European Courts).  
 181. For a comparison of the more liberal standing rules for challenging regulations in 
France as compared to Italy, see Ziller, supra note 176, at 640 (1999). 
 182. Both the Italian courts and the European Court of Justice recognize that government 
officials should enjoy significant discretion in reaching administrative decisions. In Italy, def-
erence to discretionary government decisions is particularly strong on technical matters. See 
François Lafarge, Le contrôle des décisions de l’administration en Italie, 9 L’Actualité 
Juridique Droit Administratif, 678, 685 (1999). The Court of Justice, likewise, allows the 
Commission a significant “margin of evaluation” (marge d’appréciation) on both policy and 
scientific matters and will only annul a decision if there is a “manifest error of evaluation” 
(erreur manifest d’appréciation). See Craig & de Búrca, supra note 6, at 537–39. 
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committees and the Commission. This shift from informal practice to 
law, by definition, is good for transparency. By virtue of codification, 
European citizens know that networks, not their national government 
officials acting alone, are responsible for the application and enforce-
ment of European laws. In addition, the parties to administrative 
proceedings like the decision to allow or block international data trans-
fers know the sequence of national and supranational decisions to expect 
before a determination will become final. 
Further, in mixed procedure, regulators are under a duty to notify the 
parties of the many decisions that are made in the course of the proceed-
ing, and they must give access to some of the background documents 
that inform those decisions. The Italian Data Protection Code combined 
with background principles of Italian public law require that the Garante 
notify all parties named in blocking or authorizing orders (first and sec-
ond types of administrative action) and that the Garante publish all 
general authorizations (third type of administrative action) in the Italian 
equivalent of the U.S. Federal Register (Gazzetta Ufficiale).183 If the mat-
ter is reviewed by European officials, the outcome is published in the 
Official Journal of the European Union. Moreover, some of the back-
ground documents that informed the European phase of the proceeding 
would be available under the European access to documents law.184 And, 
if the Garante’s decision were reversed on the grounds that a country 
offered adequate privacy guarantees (first type of administrative pro-
ceeding) or a standard contract failed to guarantee adequately privacy 
(third type of administrative proceeding), the Garante would promulgate 
an Italian rule that would be published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale.185 If a 
specific applicant were prohibited from transferring personal information 
                                                                                                                      
 183. See Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella, Il Provvedimento, in 1 Trattato di Diritto 
Amministrativo, supra note 179, at 797, 879–80.  
 184. See Council and Eur. Parl. Regulation 1049/2001/EC of 30 May 2001 Regarding 
Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents, 2001 O.J. (L 
145) 43 [hereinafter Access to Documents Law]; Comitology Decision, supra note 172, at 
arts. 7–8. 
 185. The formal transposition of Commission adequacy decisions into national law is 
uncommon among Member States. Under general principles of EU law, decisions are directly 
binding and therefore, formally speaking, it is not necessary to incorporate them into national 
law. Consequently, French, German, and British regulators do not adopt national implement-
ing decisions; they assume that all members of the interested community keep abreast of 
Commission decisions. See Interview with André Albert, Magistrat au Bureau du Droit Civil 
Général, Ministère de Justice [Magistrate in the General Civil Law Bureau, Ministry of Jus-
tice] in Paris, Fr. (Oct. 21, 2002); Interview with Dr. Alexander Dix, Data Protection 
Commissioner for the Land of Brandenburg in Potsdam, Germany (July 7, 2003); Interview 
with David Smith, Assistant Commissioner, Information Commissioner’s Office in Wilmslow, 
UK (Feb. 27, 2003). While this assumption might be perfectly valid, it appears that the Ga-
rante’s practice is especially protective of the public’s right to know, in particular those 
members of the public who are not aficionados of EU law or the EU system of government. 
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as a result of an adverse European determination (second type of admin-
istrative proceeding) the Garante, again, would issue an order reversing 
the previous Italian decision and notify the party.  
Nothing in this sequence of national and European decisions com-
promises the Italian right to transparency. Indeed, in the European phase 
of the proceeding, Italian citizens gain greater insight into the determina-
tion than they would have if the privacy matter were handled by Italian 
regulators alone because the European access to documents law is more 
comprehensive than the equivalent Italian law.186 
On accountability to elected officials and the general public, by 
contrast, the European privacy network is weak. For example, a trade 
union might be unhappy with the experience of transfers of employee 
data abroad because it believes that employers use such transfers to 
circumvent Italian labor laws and discriminate against employees. To 
which elected official does the trade union complain? As a first step, the 
trade union must ask Italian parliamentarians and members of 
government to pressure the Garante to ban such transfers. A broader 
assault, however, is also necessary because of the power of other national 
regulators and the Commission to reverse the Garante’s decision. The 
Italian trade union, therefore, might decide to lobby hostile national 
governments and the European Commission through the European Trade 
Union Congress. Or it might put pressure on elected representatives in 
other national parliaments and the European Parliament to encourage their 
regulators to support the Garante’s position. In a system of government in 
which powers are shared among multiple regulators, citizens must be able 
to mobilize in the diverse political worlds in which such regulators 
operate. Yet, as is commonly acknowledged by scholars and policymakers 
alike, this form of pan-European political action is far more resource-
intensive than public campaigns at the national level alone.187 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                      
 186. Compare Access to Documents Law, supra note 184, with Legge 8 guigno 1990 n. 
142 [Law No. 142 of June 8, 1990], Gazz. Uff. no. 135 (June 12, 1990) (Italy). For a 
discussion of the Italian system, see Piergiorgio Alberti et al., Procedimento 
amministrativo e diritto di accesso ai documenti: Legge 7 agosto 1990, n. 241 e 
regolamenti di attuazione 535–69 (2d ed. 1995). 
 187. On the difficulties faced by conventional business and labor groups in mounting 
Europe-wide campaigns, see Michael J. Gorges, Euro-Corporatism: Interest Interme-
diation in the European Community 10 (1996). See also Alasdair R. Young, Consumption 
Without Representation? Consumers in the Single Market in Participation and Policy 
Making in the European Union 206, 220–25 (Helen Wallace & Alasdair R. Young eds., 
1997) (describing difficulties faced by consumer movement). For a discussion of the difficul-
ties encountered in the United States by “diffuse, unorganized groups” in organizing at the 
federal as opposed to state levels, see Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette 
of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 81 (1998); Theda 
Skocpol, Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American 
Civic Life 283 (2003). 
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Europe-wide political action on an issue like the right to privacy rests on 
a European identity that enables citizens, regardless of their nationality, 
to conceive of privacy as a commonly shared interest that warrants 
mobilization in Europe’s many national arenas and at the supranational 
level. Again, however, scholars and policymakers recognize that such an 
identity does not exist yet in the European Union.188 The hypothetical 
Italian trade union faces a stiff battle. 
B. The Administrative Practice of the 
European Privacy Network 
The reality of European regulation of international data transfers al-
ters significantly the normative assessment of individual rights and 
democratic accountability. The law of the European privacy network set 
down in the Data Protection Directive anticipates an orderly succession 
of administrative decisions: the Garante issues an initial decision, which 
is reviewed by the Commission and comitology committee and results in 
another decision, which depending on the outcome is followed by a final 
Italian implementing act.189 This procedure has proven to be pure fiction. 
The record does not contain a single episode of this kind. Rather, on in-
ternational data transfers, the Italian approach like that of most other 
national privacy authorities has been to wait and see. The Garante has 
not used its powers to block or authorize data transfers. This is to the 
detriment of both individual citizens, whose privacy rights are not pro-
tected when their information is sent abroad, and commercial and public 
entities, which operate under conditions of legal uncertainty.190 In the 
language of American administrative law, the Garante has failed to act.191  
Action, instead, has come from European institutions, and it has 
come in two forms. First, the working party of national privacy authori-
ties has developed common criteria for evaluating third country 
adequacy and standard data transfer contracts. These common criteria 
                                                                                                                      
 188. See Joseph H. H. Weiler, To Be a European Citizen: Eros and Civilization, in The 
Constitution of Europe 324, 336–56 (1999). See also Andrew Scott, Analysing the Democ-
ratic Deficit—Methodological Priors: A Comment on Moravcsik, in Integration in an 
Expanding European Union: Reassessing the Fundamentals 99, 101 (J.H.H. Weiler et 
al. eds., 2003). 
 189. See supra notes 159–166. 
 190. See generally Interview with Susannah Haan, Legal Adviser, Company Affairs, 
Data Protection Working Group, Confederation of British Industry in London, UK (Feb. 28, 
2003) (describing difficulties of legal uncertainty for British firms and ascribing such uncer-
tainty to the lack of administrative action on international data transfers). 
 191. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 3 Administrative Law Treatise 1270 (4th 
ed. 2002). 
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are informal, taking the form of opinions192 and working documents.193 
Second, as described earlier, the Commission has issued formal deci-
sions finding foreign privacy laws adequate and approving model 
contracts for international data transfers.194 Yet according to certain 
members of the private sector, formal action by the Commission has 
come too slowly.195  
Inaction and informal action are both problematic in administrative 
law. Neither is susceptible to judicial review. In the face of inaction, 
courts are reluctant to dictate a particular course of action for an agency 
because they are aware of their institutional limits. By definition, infor-
mal action is difficult to discern. Even when it is identifiable, courts are 
reluctant to deprive agencies of this flexible mode of action by requiring 
agencies to meet ordinary standards of judicial review. In Italian admin-
istrative law, wariness of interfering with administration in such 
instances is expressed through the central legal concept of the “adminis-
trative act” (atto or provvedimento), defined as a formal decision binding 
on individuals outside the agency.196 Judicial review is available only 
once an administrative act is promulgated, meaning that neither inaction 
nor informal action may be challenged in court. Indeed, the legal concept 
of an administrative act is so important that if the legislature wishes 
courts to intervene when agencies fail to act, it generally must write into 
the law that an administrative act is “presumed” after a certain time pe-
riod following the relevant event (an individual complaint or application 
to the agency).197 Likewise, under European law, it is unlikely that an 
opinion or working document would be considered an “act” amenable to 
review. It is also unlikely that the Commission’s failure to make a deter-
mination on the adequacy of a third country or model contract could be 
                                                                                                                      
 192. See, e.g., Opinion 3/2001 on the Level of Protection of the Australian Privacy 
Amendment (Privacy Sector) Act 2000, Op. Working Party on the Prot. of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Pers. Data, 5095/00/EN WP 40 final (Jan. 26, 2001). 
 193. See Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of 
the EU Data Protection Directive, Working Doc. Working Party on the Prot. of Individuals 
with Regard to the Processing of Pers. Data, DG XV D/5025/98 WP 12 (July 24, 1998). 
 194. See supra notes 95–96. 
 195. See Interview with Susannah Haan, supra note 190. 
 196. See della Cananea, supra note 156; Cassese et al., supra note 168. The adminis-
trative act is also central to German administrative law (Verwaltungsakt) and French 
administrative law (acte administratif). For a discussion of the difficulty of obtaining judicial 
review of informal action and inaction in U.S. administrative law, see generally Jerry L. 
Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (1990) (arguing that when 
the National Highway Safety Transportation Administration switched from rulemaking to 
recalls, a form of informal agency action, it became more difficult for courts to exercise judi-
cial review); Pierce, supra note 191, at 1270 (agency inaction presumptively unreviewable). 
 197. See generally Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella, Il Provvedimento, in 1 Trattato di 
Diritto Amministrativo, supra note 179, at 797, 894–96 (Sabino Cassese ed., 2d ed. 2003) 
(discussing problem of administrative “silence”). 
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challenged before the European Courts.198 When administrative action 
takes the form of inaction or informal action, the political process rather 
than courts must police for arbitrariness and illegality. In national sys-
tems, government agencies that fail to take the action necessary to 
implement certain statutory mandates or that informally implement stat-
utes contrary to public opinion should expect to face pressure from 
elected officials. 
The problem with the mixed procedure for international data trans-
fers is twofold. First, the sharing of powers between national and 
European authorities appears to have generated even more of the judi-
cially immune forms of administrative action (inaction and informal 
action) than occurs at the domestic level. National authorities, rather 
than experimenting based on their domestic experiences with informa-
tion privacy—by blocking or authorizing certain transfers—have 
preferred inaction. Because it is so difficult to anticipate threats to pri-
vacy and devise measures that will adequately safeguard privacy rights 
once personal information leaves the European Union, national privacy 
commissioners have chosen to transfer responsibility to the European 
process. The European process, however, is inherently slow, meaning 
that inaction can persist for long periods.199 In those periods, informal 
action—undertaken by the working party of national privacy authori-
ties—prevails. The structure of privacy regulation, with a formal role for 
the comitology committee and an informal role for the working party, is 
somewhat unusual even for European policymaking. Nevertheless, in-
formal action like that of the working party pervades the European 
regulatory system, both in the opinions given by numerous sector-
specific advisory committees200 and in the new form of European govern-
ance called the “Open Method of Coordination.”201 Therefore, the extent 
of informal action in the information privacy arena is likely to be repli-
cated in other policy areas.  
The second difficulty with the administrative practice of the Euro-
pean privacy network is that political accountability, which to some 
                                                                                                                      
 198. See generally Craig & de Bùrca, supra note 6, at 483, 520 (setting down EU law 
on range of reviewable acts and conditions under which failure to act is reviewable). 
 199. See generally Fritz W. Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German 
Federalism and European Integration, 66 Pub. Admin. 239 (1988). 
 200. See, e.g., Commission Decision 73/306/EEC of 25 September 1973 Relating to the 
Setting up of a Consumers’ Consultative Committee, 1973 O.J. (L 283) 18; Commission De-
cision 81/195/EEC of 16 March 1981 Setting Up, within the Advisory Committee on Seeds, a 
Special Section on the Approximation of Laws, 1981 O.J (L 88) 42; Commission Decision 
2004/391/EC of 23 April 2004 on the Advisory Groups Dealing with Matters Covered by the 
Common Agricultural Policy, 2004 O.J. (L 120) 50. 
 201. See generally Grainne de Búrca, The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance 
in the European Union, 28 Eur. L. Rev. 814 (2003). 
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extent compensates for the inability of courts to interfere under such cir-
cumstances, is weak in the European Union. As argued earlier, a system 
of shared powers requires that citizens be able to mobilize within the 
many different political communities in which regulators make their de-
cisions, both national systems and the emerging supranational system in 
Brussels. Yet Europe-wide campaigns are extremely costly and difficult 
to mount, even for an organized group like labor, which unlike many 
other interest groups and citizen causes has a European federation (the 
European Trade Union Congress). Apart from the cost, the most funda-
mental difficulty is the lack of a European identity that would sustain 
concerted Europe-wide political action through the press, voting in par-
liamentary elections, lobbying, and other avenues for holding regulators 
accountable. While this form of the democratic deficit affects all types of 
European governance, it causes special problems for networks like this 
one that are associated with inaction and informal action. In such cases, 
the courts cannot enforce the administrative law of rights against bureau-
crats and the democratic political process cannot hold administrators 
accountable. 
Although my evaluation of the European privacy network focuses on 
rights and democratic accountability, a brief remark on effectiveness is 
warranted. This network is far less effective than would be expected by 
proponents of decentralized policymaking in the domestic and interna-
tional spheres.202 As the drafters of the Data Protection Directive 
themselves stated, the requirement of “adequacy” for international trans-
fers of personal information was to serve as a general standard that 
would guide local regulators in their experiments with guaranteeing pri-
vacy.203 Those experiments would gradually lead to a Europe-wide 
approach. The Commission repeated the hope that networks in the inter-
national data transfer area would facilitate information exchange and the 
development of “best practice.”204 This official articulation of the pur-
poses and desired effects of the privacy network repeats verbatim the 
reasons that scholars have advanced in favor of decentralized and flexi-
ble administration: local experimentation and the discovery and re-
discovery of best practices in a constantly changing social and economic 
                                                                                                                      
 202. See Michael C. Dorf & Chuck F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-
talism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1998) (arguing for U.S. administrative law in which federal 
agencies set basic goals and state and local agencies experiment with implementation); Joanne 
Scott & David Trubeck, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the EU, 8 
Eur. L.J. 1 (2002) (arguing that the “Open Method of Coordination” in the European Union 
will allow local diversity to persist at the same time that common standards are generated 
through exchange of best practices); Slaughter, supra note 9, at 193 (arguing that transgov-
ernmental networks produce experimentation and the emergence of best practices). 
 203. See supra note 101. 
 204. See supra notes 107–108. 
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environment. Yet the promise of networks has not been realized in the 
information privacy area.  
Rather, the sharing of powers and responsibility in the privacy arena 
is associated with stasis and the related difficulties for liberal democratic 
ideals. The administrative action that has occurred has come from the 
center—the Commission’s adequacy decisions—not the periphery. A 
number of possible explanations come to mind: foreign relations might 
require action from the political center; protecting information privacy 
might not be a domain in which local knowledge helps; safeguarding 
privacy once personal information is transferred abroad might be so dif-
ficult that neither national privacy authorities nor European 
administration are capable of taking action. I certainly do not claim that 
paralysis is intrinsic to the sharing and fragmentation of government 
powers through networks. I merely wish to suggest that, under certain 
circumstances, networks will not live up to the high expectations that 
have been set for them.  
C. Implications for Transgovernmental Networks 
The liberal democratic shortcomings of the European privacy net-
work can inform our evaluation of other transgovernmental networks. In 
networks, decisionmaking power is shared by all nodes. Even though, 
outside the European Union, the authority to issue final, binding deci-
sions rests with individual governments, practically speaking such 
decisions are made by national officials acting in concert. Rejecting net-
work decisions, after-the-fact, through national democratic processes 
entails such high political and economic costs that only the United States 
and certain European countries can do so.205 
Sharing power with other government officials is not, in and of it-
self, problematic. Access to global markets and foreign places brings 
immense benefits and to expect to be able to obtain such access without 
accommodating the citizens, practices, and laws of those foreign places 
is unrealistic. The European case, however, suggests that the network 
form of governance can fall short of liberal democratic values and points 
to strategies through which some of these shortcomings might be reme-
died. One important means of reconciling transgovernmental networks 
with principles of liberal democracy is their codification. As in the Euro-
pean privacy example, bringing the law to networks would render them 
                                                                                                                      
 205. As Kal Raustiala argues, the regulatory model that emerges from transnational 
networks is influenced by “regulatory power” and therefore is likely to reflect the laws of the 
United States or a European state. As a result, the states that are powerful enough to reject the 
consensus view of transnational networks should also have less reason to do so. See Raustiala, 
supra note 60, at 61. 
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more visible to citizens. Codification would also inform the parties 
whose interests are directly implicated by network decisions of the divi-
sion of powers between national and transnational regulators. This would 
bring certainty and predictability to members of the interested commu-
nity, principles that are central to the rule of law ideal. Another 
improvement to transgovernmental networks suggested by the European 
example is the guarantee of public access to network documents. This 
would enable citizens to scrutinize the rationale for network decisions 
and would better equip them to hold their national regulators account-
able.  
The European case also points to problems with transnational net-
works that are less tractable. In light of the difficulties of popular 
mobilization across countries on issues like privacy, the policy decisions 
that result from transnational networks risk being compromises struck by 
government officials in isolation from the citizens whom they are sup-
posed to represent. The hurdles to transnational mobilization—to putting 
pressure on all the regulators who share and exercise power in the net-
work—are formidable.  
While the inaction observed in the privacy case study cannot be gen-
eralized to other transgovernmental networks with any analytical rigor, 
this experience serves as a useful cautionary tale. Sometimes the distri-
bution and fragmentation of power among numerous government units 
will not produce effective public action. Elaborating the conditions under 
which stalemate, rather than experimentation and best practice, will 
emerge is an area for future research in international law and the consti-
tutional law of federalism.  
The extent of informal action in the European privacy network is also 
instructive. The codification of the privacy network in the Data Protection 
Directive is an important step toward guaranteeing transparency in Euro-
pean administration. Yet the working party of national privacy authorities, 
which only has powers of informal action, has proven to be even more 
active than the Commission and the comitology committee on the issue of 
international data transfers. This suggests that because informal action is 
free from legal constraints and therefore easier to undertake, this mode of 
decisionmaking will continue to be attractive to transnational networks 
notwithstanding best efforts to the contrary.  
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V. The European Parliament and the Transatlantic 
Dispute over Information Privacy 
This assessment of European networks would be radically incomplete 
without analyzing the role of the European Parliament in shaping and 
checking the decisions of European privacy regulators. In 1999, the 
European Parliament acquired formal powers over European 
administration.206 Whenever the Commission is delegated powers of 
implementation under European law, it is generally required to act 
together with a comitology committee of national representatives, as in the 
case of international data transfers under the Data Protection Directive. 
That is, the Commission must send the proposed implementing decision to 
the committee of national regulators for deliberation and a vote. As of 
1999, the Commission must, at the same time, send the proposal to the 
European Parliament. The European Parliament does not have a formal 
veto power, but it can pass resolutions approving or disapproving of the 
proposed decision and the Commission “shall re-examine the draft 
measur[e]” in light of the parliamentary resolution.207  
From the perspective of the formal institutional prerequisites of de-
mocracy, this reform of European administration represents an 
improvement. In most Member States, parliaments have the power to 
approve or veto implementing rules proposed by their executive 
branches under enabling legislation. What in American administrative 
law is deemed an unconstitutional legislative veto, in European adminis-
trative law is considered a legitimate, constitutional device for checking 
government administration.208 In conferring the European Parliament 
with the power to receive drafts and vote resolutions, European legisla-
tors nudged the European Union one step closer to a parliamentary 
democracy model.  
Yet the European Parliament does not use this power.209 The reasons 
for the Parliament’s disinterest are fairly obvious. Hundreds of 
                                                                                                                      
 206. Comitology Decision, supra note 172, at arts. 7–8. For a comprehensive analysis of 
this reform, see Koen Lenaerts & Amaryllis Verhoeven, Towards a Legal Framework for Ex-
ecutive Rule-Making in the EU? The Contribution of the New Comitology Decision, 37 
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 645 (2000). 
 207. Comitology Decision, supra note 172, at art. 8. 
 208. See, e.g., Adam Tompkins, Delegated Legislation in the English Constitution, in 
Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC 101, 109–14 (Mads 
Andenas & Alexander Türk eds., 2000); Alexander Türk, Delegated Legislation in German 
Constitutional Law, in Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC, 
supra, at 127, 162. 
 209. See Report from the Commission on the Working of Committees in 2002, 2003 O.J. 
(C 223 E) 16, 5 (noting that no European Parliament resolutions were based on the Comitol-
ogy Decision, supra note 172, at art. 8, in 2002); Report from the Commission on the Working 
of Committees during 2001, 2003 O.J. (C 223 E) 1, 4 (noting the same for 2001); Report from 
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implementing decisions, generally involving highly technical issues, are 
proposed every year and European parliamentarians simply do not have 
the resources or the political will to follow and react to such 
developments. 
The one exception to the rule of parliamentary disinterest is in the 
area of international information privacy. On two separate occasions, the 
European Parliament used its formal powers to oppose transfers of per-
sonal information to the United States that had been authorized by the 
Commission.210 According to the Parliament, in neither case did the 
United States offer adequate protection for privacy. When the Data Pro-
tection Directive first came into force in 1998, a number of American 
companies feared that when they transferred European personal informa-
tion to the United States, their information practices would run afoul of 
European law.211 In response, the U.S. Department of Commerce initiated 
negotiations with the Commission under Article 25 of the Data Protec-
tion Directive. The two sides reached an agreement on privacy principles 
which, if adopted by U.S. organizations, would entitle those organiza-
                                                                                                                      
the Commission on the Working of the Committees during 2000, 2002 O.J. (C 37) 2, 6 ((not-
ing that the “Safe Harbor” resolution described below was the only time Parliament passed a 
resolution based on the Comitology Decision, supra note 172, at art. 8). The Commission 
report for 2003 has not been issued yet, but aside from the resolution on the EU–U.S. Passen-
ger Name Records (PNR) agreement described below, it does not appear that the Parliament 
exercised its oversight powers in 2003 or 2004. 
 210. Even before the two episodes narrated in this section, the European Parliament 
expressed doubts as to the adequacy of privacy safeguards in the United States. In the late 
1990s, the Parliament commissioned a number of reports on U.S. government surveillance and 
the potential threat posed by such surveillance to European privacy rights. See Steve 
Wright, An Appraisal of Technologies of Political Control (Scientific and Techno-
logical Options Assessment, Directorate Gen. for Research, Eur. Parl., Doc. No. PE 166.499, 
1998); Duncan Campbell, Part 2/5: The State of the Art in Communications Intelligence 
(COMINT) of Automated Processing for Intelligence Purposes of Intercepted Broadband 
Multi-Language Leased or Common Carrier Systems, and Its Applicability to COMINT Tar-
geting and Selection, Including Speech Recognition, in Development of Surveillance 
Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information (Scientific and Technological 
Options Assessment, Directorate Gen. for Research, Eur. Parl., Doc. No. PE 168.184,  
1999) [hereinafter Development], available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/stoa/publi/pdf/ 
98-14-01-2_en.pdf; Frank Leprevost, Part 3/5: Encryption and Cryptosystems in Electronic 
Surveillance: a Survey of the Technology Assessment Issues, in Development, supra, avail-
able at http://www.europarl.eu.int/stoa/publi/pdf/98-14-01-3_en.pdf; Chris Elliot, Part 4/5: 
The Legality of the Interception of Electronic Communications: A Concise Survey of the Prin-
cipal Legal Issues and Instruments under International, European and National Law,in 
Development, supra, available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/stoa/publi/pdf/98-14-01-
4_en.pdf; Nikos Bogolikos, Part 5/5: The Perception of Economic Risks Arising from the Po-
tential Vulnerability of Electronic Commercial Media to Interception, in Development, 
supra, available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/stoa/publi/pdf/98-14-01-5_en.pdf. 
 211. See Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 Houston L. 
Rev. 717, 736 (2001); Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of 
EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 Yale J. Int’l 
L. 1, 69–79. 
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tions to a “Safe Harbor” from European law and a presumption of “ade-
quacy” under the Data Protection Directive.212 The national 
representatives on the comitology committee approved the agreement 
and the Commission’s proposed decision on adequacy. But when the 
Commission sent the proposed decision to the European Parliament, it 
faced strident criticism from parliamentarians who contended that the 
Safe Harbor Principles allowed for too many exceptions and did not in-
corporate a strong enforcement mechanism.213 The Parliament passed a 
resolution opposing the Commission’s proposed adequacy finding by a 
vote of 279 to 259.214 
Another spat with the United States over privacy has provoked again 
the European Parliament to exercise its oversight powers. Following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government began de-
manding access to passenger information stored by European airlines 
(Passenger Name Records or PNR). Airlines serving the transatlantic 
market were put in a bind. If airline companies complied with U.S. de-
mands, they risked prosecution by European privacy authorities for 
failing to guarantee an adequate level of privacy protection; if they did 
not comply, they faced intrusive searches of their passengers and exten-
sive delays on arrival in the United States.215 As a stop-gap measure, the 
Commission and the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 
(Customs Bureau) issued a joint statement in February 2003: the Cus-
toms Bureau had given guarantees sufficient to render the transfer of 
passenger data temporarily lawful under European law.216 At the same 
time, the European Union and the United States launched negotiations 
on a bilateral agreement. In the course of the negotiations, the European 
Parliament passed two separate resolutions criticizing the Commission’s 
handling of the negotiations and threatening to take the Commission to 
court.217  
In December 2003, the two sides reached a tentative agreement: the 
Customs Bureau would afford European airline data certain privacy 
                                                                                                                      
 212. See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 
65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000). 
 213. Steve R. Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy Directive and International 
Relations, 35 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 655 (2002). 
 214. Id. at 678–79. 
 215. See Christopher Patten, Address to the European Parliament (Apr. 21, 2004), avail-
able at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp04_189.htm.  
 216. Id. 
 217. Eur. Parl. Resolution on Transfer of Personal Data by Airlines in the Case of 
Transatlantic Flights (P5_TA(2003)0097) (March 13, 2003), available at http:// 
www.statewatch.org/news/2004/mar/ep-pnr-report.pdf; Eur. Parl. Resolution on Transfer of 
Personal Data by Airlines in the Case of Transatlantic Flights: State of Negotiations with the 
USA, 2004 O.J. (C 81 E) 105. 
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guarantees and the Commission would adopt a decision finding the U.S. 
system “adequate.” But when the Commission forwarded the draft ade-
quacy decision to the European Parliament, it met with staunch 
opposition. On March 31, 2004, the European Parliament voted a resolu-
tion condemning the Commission decision and the EU–U.S. 
agreement.218 And, on April 21, 2004, the Parliament challenged the EU–
U.S. agreement in the European Court of Justice.219 In the eyes of the 
Parliament, its shortcomings were numerous: the purposes for which the 
Customs Bureau was permitted to use personal information were over-
broad (not only preventing and combating “terrorism and related crimes” 
but an unspecified category of “other serious crimes, including organised 
crimes”); the Customs Bureau was allowed to collect an excessive 
amount of personal data on seemingly irrelevant matters such as volun-
tary and involuntary ticket upgrades; the retention period of eight years 
for the data was excessive; and the Chief Privacy Officer in the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security did not have the independence necessary to 
enforce vigorously privacy rights.220 The Commission’s adequacy deci-
                                                                                                                      
 218. Eur. Parl. Resolution on the Draft Commission Decision Noting the Adequate Level 
of Protection Provided for Personal Data Contained in the Passenger Name Records (PNRs) 
Transferred to the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, (P5_TA(2004)0245) (March 
31, 2004), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/mar/ep-pnr-report.pdf.  
 219. See Request for an Opinion Submitted by the Eur. Parl. under Art. 300(6) of the EC 
Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 118) 1. 
 220. Eur. Parl. Resolution, supra note 217. The legal effect of the EU–U.S. agreement 
and the grounds of the European Parliament’s lawsuit are more complicated than this brief 
summary suggests. The Commission negotiated an agreement with the U.S. government in 
order to issue an adequacy decision and to enter into a bilateral international agreement with 
the U.S. government. The second form of action is unusual in the international privacy field 
and was necessary because the Customs Bureau wished to access European PNR data located 
in airline databases in the European Union. A bilateral agreement, pursuant to the treaty-
making powers of the European Community, would constitute a binding legal act. Such an act 
would give the European airlines that allowed the U.S. Customs Bureau access to their PNR 
data a ground for lawful data processing under Article 7(c) of the Data Protection Directive. 
(“Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed only if . . . processing is 
necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject.”) The 
treaty power under Article 300(3) of the EC Treaty provides that, as a rule, the Parliament 
must be consulted, but that if the treaty would alter internal European legislation the Parlia-
ment must give its assent. Given that the Parliament’s role in the administrative part of the 
decision (the adequacy decision) is less significant than in the treaty-making part of the deci-
sion (European Community’s entry into an international agreement with the United States), 
the case in the Court of Justice challenged only the international agreement. See Request for 
an Opinion, supra note 219. Parliament did so by requesting an opinion as to “whether an 
agreement envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty” under Art. 300(6) of the 
EC Treaty. The Parliament claimed that because the EU-U.S. agreement infringed and altered 
the guarantees of the Data Protection Directive, the Parliament should have had the right of 
assent, not simply consultation. Id. The Parliament also claimed that, regardless of the proce-
dure, the agreement was invalid because it breached a fundamental principle of EU law, 
namely the right to privacy. Before the Court could rule on the Parliament’s request for an 
opinion, the EU-U.S. agreement came into force. Therefore, the Parliament decided to with-
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sion has since taken effect221 and the European Parliament’s legal chal-
lenge is pending in the Court of Justice.222 
How do we explain this exceptional degree of parliamentary activ-
ism? Why has the European Parliament chosen to intervene in the 
information privacy field when, in other areas of European administra-
tion, the Commission routinely forwards proposed implementing 
measures and the Parliament routinely does nothing?  Undoubtedly, 
part of the answer rests in the ease with which the seemingly techno-
cratic issue of “data protection” can be reframed as an issue of 
fundamental importance to the European people. The privacy rights of 
citizens are imperiled. Such rights are not simply German, Italian, or 
French, they are European. Since the early 1970s, the Court of Justice 
has recognized a common set of fundamental rights shared by all citi-
zens of the European Union, which today includes information 
privacy223; since the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
2000, the European Union has a highly symbolic, written catalogue of 
rights, which includes the “right to the protection of personal data.”224 
The right to the protection of personal data represents a deeply moral 
issue around which parliamentarians—and those who vote for them—
can rally. When such basic rights are threatened by a powerful outsider 
like the United States, they become even more salient. Indeed, Parlia-
ment’s championing of the European right to privacy is as much a 
reflection of an existing, common right as it is a creature of perceived 
difference with the United States.225  
The Safe Harbor and the airline passenger data episodes are evi-
dence of nascent democracy in the European system of administrative 
                                                                                                                      
draw its request for an opinion and to bring two new actions challenging the European legal 
acts through which the agreement had come into force. See Action brought on 27 July 2004 by 
the European Parliament against the Council of the European Union: Case C-317/04, 2004 OJ 
(C 228) 31; Action brought on 27 July 2004 by the European Parliament against the Commis-
sion of the European Communities: Case C-318/04, 2004 OJ (C 228) 32. The grounds of both 
actions are similar to those of the request for an opinion. 
 221. See Commission Decision 2004/535/EC of 14 May 2004 on the Adequate Protec-
tion of Personal Data Contained in the Passenger Name Record of Air Passengers Transferred 
to the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11. 
 222. See Action brought on 27 July 2004 by the European Parliament against the Coun-
cil of the European Union: Case C-317/04, 2004 OJ (C 228) 31; Action brought on 27 July 
2004 by the European Parliament against the Commission of the European Communities: 
Case C-318/04, 2004 OJ (C228) 32. 
 223. See, e.g., Cases C-465/00, C-138/01, and C-138/01, Rechnungshof and others, 2003 
E.C.R. I-4989, point 74. 
 224. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.  
 225. Timothy Garton Ash argues similarly that an identity that spans the entire European 
Union will be based on “contrast with, if not outright opposition to, America.” Timothy Gar-
ton Ash, Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West 55 
(2004). 
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networks. As a matter of the formal institutional prerequisites of democ-
racy, participation of the directly elected legislative assembly in the 
administration of international data transfers can only be a good thing.226 
The transatlantic dispute over privacy also revealed a common European 
identity and contributed to the formation of that European identity. This 
too is good for democracy. A shared identity that transcends the nation 
satisfies one of the sociological preconditions of European democracy.227 
Such an identity enables citizens to mobilize irrespective of nationality 
in the many different political systems—national and supranational—in 
which European regulators operate. Currently, European citizens con-
sider the European Parliament as a sideline to the important business of 
national government. And some would say for good reason. At present, 
the European Parliament is responsible for making seemingly insignifi-
cant decisions such as what types of sweet, dark substances can be called 
“chocolate” and how glass bottles should be recycled. The stand that the 
European Parliament took on privacy is just one of many debates that, 
over time, will render the European Parliament an important institution 
with real significance for European voters. As parliamentary votes and 
European elections are framed as choices on values and rights, democ-
racy will follow.  
But let us step back for a moment. What if the European Parliament 
had the power to veto Commission implementing decisions, not simply 
condemn such decisions in non-binding resolutions? The answer, quite 
simply, is that neither the Safe Harbor principles nor the PNR agreement 
would have been concluded. Conflict, not concession, was what the 
European democratic process demanded. In the early stages of the PNR 
dispute, the U.S. government’s categorical and inflexible demands for 
information on European citizens created difference, which gave rise to a 
political opportunity for the European Parliament. The Parliament could 
take a stand on European values. Once this democratic process was trig-
gered, transatlantic compromise was low on the European political 
agenda. To go back to transgovernmental networks, the rise of democ-
racy in European networks was at odds with effective international 
cooperation through another network—the transatlantic one between the 
European Commission and the U.S. Customs Bureau. The constitutional 
transformation underway in the European Union holds out the promise 
of democratizing one of the world’s most advanced examples of interna-
                                                                                                                      
 226. For a formal institutional definition of democracy and an analysis of democracy in 
the European Union from that perspective, see, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the 
‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union, in Integration in an 
Expanding European Union: Reassessing the Fundamentals 77 (J.H.H. Weiler et al. 
eds., 2003). 
 227. For a sociological definition of democracy, see, e.g., Scott, supra note 188, at 102. 
BIGNAMI TYPE.DOC 5/10/2005  9:16 AM 
Spring 2005] Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy 867 
 
tional cooperation. Yet, at the same time, the changing nature of Euro-
pean politics is likely to frustrate cooperation in other arenas of global 
governance. 
Conclusion 
Europe and increasingly the world govern through networks. The 
case of the European network of information privacy regulators is in-
structive on a number of counts. Networks will emerge only if 
government officials agree on the underlying policy objectives of the 
network or if some States can derive significant benefits by adopting the 
policies of other States. We would predict, therefore, that networks and 
the beneficial effects of networks are more likely to emerge in certain 
policy areas than in others. Human rights, for instance, is an area in 
which transnational governance by networks of government prosecutors 
is unlikely to emerge. States disagree on how to define rights outside of 
flagrant abuses such as genocide. Even more important, governments 
and markets are not as ready to use incentives to induce States to adopt 
western approaches as they are in fields such as antitrust and intellectual 
property law. 
The European experience also shows that, to some extent, networks 
can be brought under the disciplining force of the law. The mixed proce-
dure established under the Data Protection Directive is one such example 
of bringing the law to informal transnational practice. In doing so, citi-
zens can continue to enjoy many of the rights guaranteed under the 
administrative law of liberal democracies. Democratic accountability, 
however, suffers. With the possible exception of the United States and 
certain European States, the democratic process within a single country 
cannot hold network regulators accountable. Precisely because policy-
making decisions are made not by national regulators acting alone but by 
all the officials in the network, political mobilization at the national level 
is not enough. Citizens must be capable of banding together and taking 
action in the multiple nations and political communities in which regula-
tors operate, and yet citizens are divided by lack of resources and 
national identities. 
Turning to administrative practice, the regulation of international 
data transfers demonstrates that sometimes inaction, not effective gov-
ernance, can result from regulatory networks. Furthermore, even after 
the law is brought into a transgovernmental network, informal action 
may persist. In those instances, individual rights suffer. Compared with 
national administration, transnational inaction and informal action is par-
ticularly worrisome because of democracy’s dysfunctions in the 
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transnational arena. The European Parliament’s recent effort to protect 
the privacy of information transferred to the United States suggests that, 
under certain conditions, those dysfunctions might be overcome. The 
impact of nascent European democracy on other transnational networks 
and the communities served by them remains to be seen.  
